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CONSCRIPTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
Leon Friedman* 
J. INTRODUCTION 
THE general words of the Constitution-famous phrases such as "due process," "freedom of speech," "interstate commerce," 
and "raise and support armies"-are not self-evident concepts. As 
Justice Frankfurter said, "The language of the [Constitution] is to 
be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols 
of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those 
who employed them. Not what words did Madison and Hamilton 
use, but what was it in their minds which they conveyed?"1 While 
the framers obviously could not have foreseen the discovery of elec-
tromagnetic radio waves or atomic energy, and had no "intent" 
concerning the regulation of television stations or uranium piles, 
they knew only too well the dangers of a professional army and the 
need for training and mobilizing the citizens for defense. They 
considered these problems in more detail than those of virtually 
any other governmental function, and thus the plans they made for 
our nation's military forces deserve detailed inquiry. Such a study 
reveals that the military structure presently existing in the United 
States, which depends primarily upon direct conscription of citizens 
into the federal army, fails to meet the standards established by the 
framers of the Constitution in 1787. 
Arguments about conscription produce rather strange alliances. 
The left has traditionally opposed the draft on the grounds that it 
violates the conscientious beliefs of those opposed to war, compels 
participation in military adventures against reform movements 
throughout the world, and generally lays the heavy hand of govern-
ment too forcefully on the shoulders of every citizen. The con-
• B.A. 1954, LL.B. 1960, Harvard University.-Ed. 
This Article is based upon a study which was prepared for the New York Civil 
Liberties Union as a basic memorandum on the military clauses of the Constitution. 
Its purpose was to show that the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 is unconsti-
tutional since it exceeds the powers granted to the federal government. This Article 
does not purport to examine the desirability or undesirability of any system of fed-
eral conscription; it attempts only to marshal the available historical evidence to 
demonstrate that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to grant Congress 
the power to conscript. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the editorial suggestions of Alan H. Levine 
of the New York Civil Liberties Union, and the invaluable assistance in researching 
and preparing this Article provided by Edwin G. Burrows, David Osher, and Dennis 
Van Essendelft, of the Columbia University Graduate Department of History. 
1. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1950) (concurring opinion). 
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tinuing viability of this tradition is exemplified by Senator Mark 
Hatfield's recent assertion that a volunteer army would "preserve 
individual liberty and freedom as much as possible from unjustified 
intrusion by the government" and still provide "maximum national 
security with the greatest efficiency and economy."2 The far right 
also has frequently called for a volunteer army, but for markedly 
different reasons. Many conservatives and military men prefer a 
professional army since regulars are more easily trained and con-
trolled, and a permanent corps is more efficient in the long run be-
cause of the lower turn-over in personnel. Such a professional force 
also fits traditional elitist ideas held by the right about the organiza-
tion of society. 
Others have argued that a federal draft is necessary not only to 
mobilize the nation's manpower most efficiently in an emergency, 
but also to serve as a check upon military adventures that offend the 
political conscience of the country. While a volunteer army would 
necessarily be "composed of the poor and the black,"3 a conscripted 
army is made up of all classes. And, to the extent that the sons of 
the middle class are unwilling hostages of the military, their parents 
will want to know exactly where they will be sent and why. Opposi-
tion to the Vietnam war seems to be growing even among the 
traditionally conservative areas of the Midwest for precisely this 
reason. President Nixon, who reads the political pulse very clearly, 
has pressed for an end to the war and an end to the draft4 because 
he is aware of these sentiments. 
Thus, the basic organization of our military forces involves 
problems that are crucial to the democratic process. The worries 
and concerns that troubled the framers of the Constitution are still 
with us, and, as the debate on the draft continues, another look 
backward may be worthwhile. 
II. THE SELECTIVE DRAFT LAW CASES 
A. Background of the Cases 
In the 1918 decision of the Selective Draft Law Cases (Aroer 
v. United States), 5 the United States Supreme Court first upheld 
the constitutionality of congressional conscription. These decisions 
have never been seriously challenged, and have been cited re-
2. A Volunteer Army Is the Answer, N.Y. Times, March 30, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 34, 35. 
3. G. REEDY, WHo WILL Do OUR FIGHTING FOR Us? 56 (1969). 
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at I, col. 8. 
5. 245 U.S. 366. Arver was the principal decision among the three contempo-
raneous cases dealing with the question; see notes 8-9 infra and accompanying text. 
Hereafter "Arver" will be used interchangeably with "Selective Draft Law Cases." 
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peatedly as determining that question once and for all time. This 
Article will attempt to show that the Selective Draft Law Cases 
were based upon superficial arguments, disregard of substantial 
historical evidence, and undue deference to the exigencies of the 
First World War-in short, that they were incorrectly decided. 
The cases arose in the midst of World War I and were decided 
only eight months after passage of the 1917 draft law.6 The Selective 
Draft Act had been signed into law on May 18, 1917, and June 5 
was set as registration day for all young men of draft age. Two 
who refused to register were Joseph F. Arver and Otto H. 
Wangerin; they were indicted on June 8, 1917, tried the following 
month before a United States district court in Minnesota, found 
guilty, and sentenced to one year in prison. The Supreme Court 
granted a writ of error directly to the trial court,7 and argument 
was presented on December 13 and 14, 1917, along with the cases 
of other draft resisters from New York. At the same time the Court 
heard the appeals of Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, 8 
two noted anarchist leaders who had been found guilty of con-
spiring to counsel resistance to the draft law in New York, and 
the appeals of Charles E. Ruthenberg, Alfred Wagenknecht, and 
Charles Baker, prominent Ohio Socialists who were convicted of 
encouraging a young man not to register.0 
In asserting the invalidity of the draft, the defendants pressed 
two primary arguments: that the thirteenth amendment's prohibi-
tion of involuntary servitude deprived Congress of any power to 
conscript; and that the draft conflicted with the militia clauses of 
the Constitution since the federal government had effectively de-
stroyed the state forces by drawing all the members of the state 
militia into federal service and shipping them overseas. In the 
course of their argument, the defendants traced the history of 
English military organization, emphasizing that no general conscrip-
tion law had been passed in England prior to the twentieth century. 
They also claimed that the acts and regulations of the draft unlaw-
fully delegated legislative authority to the President. 
The Government's case was argued by John W. Davis, then 
Solicitor General, later Democratic presidential candidate, and one 
of the greatest advocates ever to practice before the Supreme Court. 
6. Act of May 18, 1917, 40 Stat. 76. 
7. At this time, a writ of error could be taken from the district court directly to 
the Supreme Court in any case involving "the construction or application of the Con-
stitution of the United States." Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 238, 36 Stat. 1157. 
8. Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918). 
9. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918). 
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Davis submitted a joint brief for all of the cases, and Chief Justice 
Edward White carefully followed it in his opinion upholding the 
law. Davis characterized the power to conscript as an essential attri-
bute of sovereignty. He cited the large number of nations enforcing 
compulsory military service in 1917, concluding: "It would be a 
contradiction in terms to declare the Government of the United 
States a sovereign, endowed with all the powers necessary for its 
existence, yet lacking in the most essential of all-the power of 
self-defense."10 The Government also cited the many colonial and 
state laws in force before 1787-almost 200 were listed-calling 
for compulsory militia service by all male ciitzens. Davis argued that 
the fact that a federal draft was proposed (although not passed) in 
1814 and the fact that a conscription law was enacted during the Civil 
War showed the practical exercise of the power and was therefore a 
recognition of it. 
Nor were the militia clauses of the Constitution11 relevant, he 
claimed, since men were taken directly into a federal army by the 
1917 law rather than as members of a federalized state militia. 
Finally, the Government dismissed the thirteenth amendment argu-
ment by pointing out that the sole purpose of the amendment was 
to abolish chattel slavery, not to eliminate compulsory governmental 
service. 
Surprisingly, none of the parties in the Selective Draft Law 
Cases relied to any extent on precedent or history. There had been 
a few remarks about conscription in earlier federal cases,12 and a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Kneedler v. Lane,13 had upheld 
the Civil War draft. But no Supreme Court decision that was on 
point had ever been handed down. Even though the Government's 
brief was 137 pages long, only three pages were devoted to the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 and to the various state ratifying 
conventions while an additional three pages contained citations 
from The Federalist Papers. Yet these sources are traditionally the 
most important aid to constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the 
petitioners' briefs in A rver discussed the same subject matter in only 
one paragraph. Thus, the Court was deprived of the most crucial 
materials on which to base its decision. 
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion upholding the con-
IO. Brief for the United States at 10, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 
(1918). 
11. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 16; id., art. I, § 10. 
12. See, e.g., In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890); Tarble's Case, BO U.S. (13 
Wall.) 397, 408 (1871). 
13. 45 Pa. 238 (1863). 
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scription law followed the government's presentation closely. In 
essence, Chief Justice White found that the constitutional pro-
visions granting Congress power "to declare war"14 and "to raise 
and support armies,"15 combined with the necessary and proper 
clause, permitted the Government to draft citizens directly into a 
federal army.16 
The Chief Justice's opinion placed principal reliance on five 
points. (1) The constitutional language allowing Congress to raise 
armies permitted a compulsory draft, since Congress must have the 
power to procure men by any means for those armies. (2) All nations 
as attributes of sovereignty have the right to conscript. (3) The 
English had compelled military service throughout their history. 
(4) The colonies had also used conscription into the militia. (5) 
The Continental Congress' lack of power to raise and control its 
own army was one of the reasons for the formation of the new Con-
stitution. The Court then went beyond the Federalist period and 
noted that in 1814 Secretary of War James Monroe had proposed 
a plan for conscription, and that a conscription law had been passed 
during the Civil War. An analysis of each constituent part of the 
Court's opinion shows how the political pressures of World War I 
produced a chain of errors in this most crucial case concerning the 
federal government's relationship to its citizens. 
B. Constitutional Language 
Chief Justice White began his opinion by quoting the various 
military clauses in the Constitution. He then wrote: 
As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to compose 
it, on the face of the Constitution the objection that it does not give 
power to provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous for 
further notice .... [I]t is said, the right to provide is not denied 
by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot in-
clude the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This 
however but challenges the existence of all power, for a govern-
mental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can 
only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertions is 
in no substantial sense a power.17 
14. Art. I, § 8, cl. II. 
15. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
16, The Government cited an earlier federal case, United States v. Sugar, 243 F. 
423, 436 (E.D. Mich. 1917), for the proposition that "power to declare war necessarily 
involves the power to carry it on, and this implies the means, saying nothing • • • 
of the express power 'to raise and support armies' as the provided means.'' Since war 
had been declared, it was not necessary to distinguish between the two sources of 
congressional power. Brief for the United States at 12, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 
U.S. 480 (1918). 
17. 245 U.S. at 377-78. 
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However, as shown below,18 the proposed grant of power to raise a 
federal army by any means was questioned or opposed by a sub-
stantial political group when the Constitution was submitted for 
ratification. The Antifederalists did not wish a standing army of any 
kind to be established by the central government; thus the bare 
power to enlist a military force was significant in terms of the Con-
federation experience and in terms of the restrictions suggested by 
the critics of the Constitution. Furthermore, none of the federal 
government's enumerated powers can be exercised "without the men 
to compose" the offices involved. Did the grant of authority "to estab-
lish Post Offices" carry with it the power to conscript postmen? Does 
the power to "coin money" include the power to conscript employees 
for the mint? Without the specific grants in article I, Congress 
might not be able to expend public monies to build post offices or 
mints or to buy arms, and might not even be able to pay its em-
ployees in these branches of government. But no one ever suggested 
before the Arver case that any other enumerated power included 
authority to compel service in the governmental organization in-
volved. 
C. Universality of Conscription 
To show that compulsory service was required by the Constitu-
tion, the Court noted that in 1918 most of the nations of the world 
had compulsory military service.19 However, the fact that every other 
nation in the world may have enforced conscription during World 
War I is irrelevant if the framers of the Constitution did not grant 
Congress that power. The United States may be the only nation 
with an electoral college system of choosing its chief executive or 
with a federal system with prohibitions on local interference with 
interstate commerce. The fact that virtually every other jurisdiction 
in the world permits the use of illegally seized evidence in criminal 
trials is of no relevance when an interpretation of our Constitution 
is at issue. 
Compulsory military service was not enacted in any modem na-
tion until more than ten years after the ratification of the Con-
stitution. A leading authority on conscription has described it as 
"something characteristically modem [which] occurred for the :first 
18. See text accompanying notes 128-74 infra. 
19. 245 U.S. at 378: 
It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its 
duty to the citizens includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render 
military service in case of need and the right to compel it •••• To do more than 
state the proposition is absolutely unnecessary in view of the practical illustra-
tion afforded by the almost universal legislation to that effect now in force. 
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time in France [in] 1798."20 Moreover, to argue that the Constitu-
tion does not permit a draft does not deny the "obligation of the 
citizen to render military service in case of need and the right to 
compel it." The framers knew that the nation's manpower might 
have to be marshalled in an emergency; but, as shown below, the 
system they selected was one requiring mobilization through the 
state militia system, not direct conscription into a federal army. 
Finally, at present, a much smaller group of nations enforces direct 
conscription than did in 1918; for example, Great Britain, Canada, 
India, and Pakistan do not have a direct draft today.21 But clearly 
the Constitution does not change as a larger or smaller number of 
foreign states pass laws on military service, and thus the Arver 
Court's reliance on the universality of conscription is at best mar-
ginally relevant. 
D. The English Experience 
The next argument advanced in the Selective Draft Law Cases 
was drawn from the military history of Great Britain. In one rather 
terse paragraph, the Court concluded: 
In England it is certain that before the Norman Conquest the duty 
of the great militant body of the citizens was recognized and enforci-
ble . . . . It is unnecessary to follow the long controversy between 
Crown and Parliament as to the branch of the government in which 
the power resided, since there never was any doubt that it some-
where resided. So also it is wholly unnecessary to explore the situa-
tion for the purpose of fixing the sources whence in England it came 
to be understood that the citizen or the force organized from the 
militia as such could not without their consent be compelled to 
render service in a foreign country, since there is no room to con-
tend that such principle ever rested upon any challenge of the right 
of Parliament to impose compulsory duty upon the citizen to per-
form military duty wherever the public exigency exacted, whether 
at home or abroad. This is exemplified by the present English Ser-
vice Act.22 
To cite the English experience before the Norman Conquest as 
a precedent for the American Constitution is far fetched at the 
very least. Similarly, the fact that the English Service Act of 1916 
may have compelled service abroad has little relevance to the inten-
tion of the framers in 1787. But, ignoring these difficulties, the 
20, Colby, Conscription in Modern Form, THE INFANTRY JouRNAL, June 1929, 
quoted in Freeman, The Constitutionality of Peacetime Conscription, 31 VA. L. REv. 
40, 68 (1944). 
21. Conscription, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 366, 368 (1967 ed.). 
22, 245 U.S. at 378-79. 
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Court leaped over a thousand years of English history in a few brief 
sentences and disregarded the crucial period preceding the Revolu-
tionary War. The latter omission is particularly unfortunate, for an 
examination of the relevant historical period clearly demonstrates 
that during colonial times the regular army forces in England were 
always composed of volunteers. 
In Cromwell's time, the Levellers and other republican sup-
porters had demanded specific protection against conscription as 
part of the basic freedoms of all Englishmen. The original "Agree-
ment of the People" presented to the Council of the Army in 1647 
contained a section which proclaimed that "constraining any of 
us to serve in the wars is against our freedom; and therefore we do 
not allow it in our Representatives."23 
The Agreement of the People which was finally passed by the 
House of Commons in 1648 specifically provided: 
We do not empower [Parliament] to impress or constrain any per-
son to serve in foreign war, either by sea or land, nor for any mili-
tary service within the kingdom; save that they may take order for 
the forming, training and exercising of the people in a military way, 
to be in readiness for resisting of foreign invasions, suppressing of 
sudden insurrections, or for assisting in execution of the laws; and 
may take order for the employing and conducting of them for those 
ends; provided, that even in such cases, none be compellable to go 
out of the county he lives in, if he procure another to serve in his 
room.24 
The behavior of Cromwell's troops in suppressing Parliament and 
taking command of the government proved to later commentators 
that a standing military force, independent of legislative control, 
was the most dangerous enemy of liberty. John Trenchard, one of 
the great liberal pamphleteers and an important influence on 
American colonial thought, wrote in 1698 that Cromwell's reign 
was 
a true and lively Example of a Government ·with an Army; an Army 
that was raised in the Cause, and for the sake of Liberty; composed 
for the most part of Men of Religion and Sobriety. If this Army 
could commit such violences upon a Parliament always successful, 
that had acquired so much Reputation both at home and abroad, at 
a time when the whole People were trained in Arms, and the Pulse 
of the Nation beat high for Liberty; what are we to expect ..• in a 
future Age.25 
23. S. GARDINER, THE CoNS1UUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 
1625·60, at 334 (2d ed. 1899). 
24. Id. at 368-69. 
25. A Short History of Standing Armies, in l A COLLECTION OF TRAcrs OF JOHN 
TRENCKARD AND THOMAS GoRDON 71-72 (1751). 
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Trenchard described the subsequent excesses of Charles II's 
time-the bribery of Parliament, the dissolution of the municipal 
corporations, the defiance of the Constitution-as a direct out-
growth of the king's control of a professional army.26 Seizing upon 
the pretext of a war with Holland, Charles raised a force of 12,000 
men but kept half of them near London so that they would be 
available for use against the legislative leaders. When the House 
of Commons ordered the Army disbanded, Charles dissolved Parlia-
ment; a new House again voted to disperse the army, and passed 
a resolution stating that "the continuance of any Standing Forces 
in this Nation other than the Militia, was illegal, and a great 
Grievance and Vexation to the People."21 
Charles' successor, James II, continued the effort to maintain 
his own armed forces. When the Duke of Monmouth attempted to 
overthrow him in 1685, James increased the army to 15,000 men 
and later 30,000. To strengthen his position against Parliament, he 
sought allies among the Protestant dissenters and filled the army 
with Irish Catholics until they constituted about one third of his 
total forces. According to Trenchard, James "violated the Rights of 
the People, fell out with the Church of England, made uncertain 
Friends of the Dissenters and disobliged his own Army; by which 
means they all united against him."28 William of Orange and Mary 
ascended to the English throne in 1689, and shortly thereafter 
Parliament passed a Declaration of Rights, the basic Bill of Rights 
in the English Constitution. The sixth article of the Declaration 
stated: "That the raising or keeping a standing army within the 
kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, 
is against law."29 In Trenchard's view, however, even William went 
too far in organizing his army. War in Ireland led Parliament to 
grant the king 50,000 men and Trenchard wrote: "I will venture 
to say, that if this Army does not make us Slaves, we are the only 
People upon Earth in such Circumstances that ever escaped it, with 
the 4th part of their number."30 
John Trenchard and his later collaborator Thomas Gordon were 
significant transmitters of English liberal thought to the colonies. 
Historian Bernard Bailyn wrote of the English "coffeehouse radicals": 
26. Id. at 74-75: "But he durst not have dreamt of all these Violations if he had 
not had an Army to justify them • • • • [H]e rais'd Guards in England (a Thing 
unheard of before in our English Constitution) and by degrees increas'd them, till 
they became a formidable Army • • • ." 
27. Id. at 76-77 
28. Id. at 80. 
29. I W. & M., 2d sess., c. 2 (1688 O.S.). 
!10. Trenchard, supra note 25, at 78. 
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More than any other single group of writers they shaped the mind 
of the American Revolutionary generation. To the colonists the 
most important of these publicists and intellectual middlemen were 
those spokesmen for extreme libertarianism, John Trenchard . . • 
and Thomas Gordon.31 
The overreachings of Cromwell, Charles II, and James II through 
their control of standing armies were prominent in the minds of the 
colonists as examples of the destruction of freedom; as Trenchard 
had written, "in no Country, Liberty and an Army stand together; 
so that to know whether a People are Free or Slaves, it is necessary 
only to ask, whether there is an Army kept amongst them."32 The 
answer to this threat lay in a militia system in which the "Nobility 
and chief Gentry of England are the Commanders, and the Body 
of it made up of the Freeholders, their Sons and Servants."33 To 
Englishmen who shared this belief that a professional army was an 
instrument of tyranny, the idea of direct conscription into that 
force was unthinkable. 
Proposals to conscript for the regular Army were advanced in 
Parliament in 1704 and 1707, but were rejected.34 Moreover, under 
the military laws passed in 1756,35 1757,36 1778,37 and 1779,38 only 
idle and disorderly persons were pressed into service, and then only 
as punishment. This too was strongly condemned. It is true that 
compulsory service for the British militia system was theoretically 
established during this period; the act of 1757 provided an elaborate 
structure for choosing the militia on a territorial basis.39 However, 
an extensive system of exemptions or substitutes made it extremely 
unlikely that a nonvolunteer would be taken. Professor J. R. 
Western, the leading expert on the English militia system, has 
noted: · 
The development of the law on the raising of militiamen can be 
summed up by saying that the principle of obligatory personal ser~ 
vice receded farther and farther into the background. Every facility 
and encouragement was given for the discharge of the obligation by 
some means of voluntary enlistment, and few balloted men seemed 
to have had to serve in person save by their own free will.40 
31. THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35 (1967). 
32. Trenchard, An Argument Shewing that a Standing Army Is Inconsistent with a 
Free Government, in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS, supra note 25, at 14. 
33. Id. at 23. 
34. Freeman, supra note 20, at 68-69. 
35. 29 Geo. 2, c. 4. 
36. 30 Geo. 2, c. 8. 
37. 18 Geo. 3, c. 53. 
38. 19 Geo. 3, c. 10. 
39. 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, §§ 19-21. 
40. THE ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 254 (1965). 
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Professor Western also points out that a great many Englishmen 
found compulsory military service so "profoundly distasteful" that 
there were numerous riots against service in the militia after passage 
of the act of 1757, but that popular unrest abated when it became 
understood that the law could be avoided and "real conscription 
was not to be introduced."41 This strong popular opposition to con-
scription occurred despite the fact that the English militia acts 
specifically provided that no militiamen would be forced to serve 
abroad and that only a limited amount of service was required at 
home.42 Nonetheless popular hostility to military service was wide-
spread and the people's aversion to forced military service, even in 
the militia, continued for many years. 
The American colonial leaders were steeped in this anti-military 
tradition; the available evidence indicates that they were extremely 
sensitive to the dangers of a professional army and that they saw 
clearly the distinction between regular forces and the armed citi-
zenry composing the militia. They were also conscious of the fact 
that no general compulsory conscription law for the regular army 
was in force in England during the eighteenth century. 
E. The Colonial Militia 
After discussing the English experience, the Supreme Court in 
the Selective Draft Law Cases cited the colonial militia system as a 
precedent for conscription: 
In the Colonies before the separation from England, there cannot 
be the slightest doubt that the right to enforce military service was 
unquestioned and that practical effect was given to the power in 
many cases. Indeed the brief of the Government contains a list of 
Colonial acts manifesting the power and its enforcement in more 
than two hundred cases .... [I]t is indisputable that the States in 
response to the calls made upon them [by the Continental Congress] 
met the situation when they deemed it necessary by directing en-
forced military service on the part of the citizens. In fact the duty 
of the citizen to render military service and the power to compel 
him against his consent to do so was expressly sanctioned by the 
constitutions of at least nine of the States.43 
However, the colonial militia system has only the most tenuous con-
nection to any modem conscription program. In the first place, the 
militia was thought of as the armed citizenry as a whole; that is, 
every able-bodied man was expected to own a weapon and to use it 
41. Id. at 290-91. 
42. E.g., 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, §§ 19, 24, 51 (1757). 
4!!. 245 U.S. at 379-80. 
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for the protection of his colony. Second, the primary duty ex-
pected of each militiaman was merely that he enroll, arm, muster, 
and attend periodic general training sessions.44 This system hardly 
qualifies as a precedent for forced conscription of a citizen for an 
uninterrupted period in a regular army. 
As Professor Russell F. Weigley points out, a distinction soon 
developed between the "Common Militia"-the entire population 
of able-bodied men-and the "Volunteer Militia" which in fact per-
formed the functions required of an armed force: 
·when troops were needed for a campaign, the legislatures assigned 
quotas to the local militia districts. The local officials then called 
for volunteers and could impress or draft men when sufficient num-
bers did not come forward. Usually, compulsory service was limited 
to expeditions within the colony .... 
Out of these methods there naturally grew more or less perma-
nent formations of those persons willing to volunteer for active 
duty .... 45 
The Selective Service System in its 1947 monograph The Back-
grounds of Selective Service attempted to expand the Arver opin-
ion's collection of compulsory colonial laws, citing hundreds of 
statutes which it claimed were precedents for federal conscription. 
But the laws show that the only element of compulsion in the 
colonial militia related to mustering and training. The training 
itself was often extremely lax, except in times of emergency.4.6 
Furthermore, most of the colonial statutes requiring periods of 
actual military service rather than mere training stipulated that the 
power existed only for defensive purposes. The Virginia statutes, 
for example, provided that men could be raised only in case of 
attack or upon certain knowledge of Indian presence.47 
Initially, most of the colonial laws restricted militia service to 
duty within the colony except in emergency situations, when the 
44. See, e.g., R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 6 (1967): 
The Massachusetts [militia] Law of 1631, passed when the colony was so new 
that it was extremely insecure, called for weekly drills, to be held every Satur-
day. Later it seemed safe enough to drill less often, and in 1637, training days 
were set at eight a year. When danger reappeared, training again intensified pro-
portionately; there were twice-weekly drills during King Philip's War in 1675-76. 
On the training days, a town's militia company generally assembled on public 
grounds, held roll call and prayer, practiced the manual of arms and close order 
drill, and passed under review and inspection by the militia officers and other 
public officials. There might also be target practice and sham battles followed 
in the afternoon-when times were not too perilous--by refreshments, games, and 
socializing. 
45. Id. at 8. 
46. Cf. note 44 supra. 
47. See SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, 2 BACKGROUNDS OF SELEcrIVE SERVICE, pt. 14, at 4, 
62, 76, 145, 166, 178-79 (Special Monograph No. 1, 1947) [hereinafter. BACKGROUNDS]. 
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governor could permit service outside the borders for limited pur-
poses.48 In later years the laws restricted to nonfreeholders compul-
sory service which would lead to expeditions outside the colony. 
A Virginia law passed in 175249 gave the colony power to levy 
vagrants or nonvoters, but no person who had a right to vote could 
be forced to serve outside Virginia. A later Virginia statute50 also 
provided that only vagrants and the unemployed could be impressed 
for service beyond the borders of the colony. This restriction was 
congruent with the English practice, which made the militia strictly 
a county force except in time of invasion and excluded all peacetime 
service outside the immediate borders of the organizing province. 
The Massachusetts laws were comparable. Special legislation 
was necessary to permit service outside the colony, 51 and service 
was required only against an "attempt or enterprize [at] the destruc-
tion or invasion, detriment or annoyance of our province."52 Simi-
larly, Sou.th Carolina passed a law in 1778 permitting "all idle, lewd, 
disorderly men," "sturdy beggars," and "vagrants" to go out of the 
state into the Continental Army ranks to fill the state's quotas.53 
In many states personal service from each citizen was not re-
quired. Liberal laws existed which provided for either substitution 
or payment of a small fine in lieu of service. For example, in 
Massachusetts there were five laws passed between 1740 and 1781 
allowing a man to arrange for a substitute to take his place in 
the militia.54 Other states, including Connecticut, Virginia, and 
New York, passed legislation providing for a small fine which freed 
citizens from virtually all forms of militia service. This practice 
became increasingly frequent in later years of the colonial period.55 
By the 1750's and the 1760's the need for even minimal universal 
training of all the males of the colonies had receded, and the trend 
was away from any kind of compulsion. No fewer than nine states 
abandoned compulsory military establishments in this period.56 The 
fact that vagrants and the unemployed were swelling the ranks of 
the militia, as they had filled the ranks of the British standing army 
following the statute of 1756, made military service less and less 
desirable. A recent commentator has noted: 
48. R. '\VEIGLEY, supra note 44, at 8. 
49. 2 BACKGROUNDS, pt. 14, at 123-24. 
50. Id. at 186-87. 
51. Id., pt. 6, at 205, 214-15. 
52. Id. at 137. 
53. Id., pt. 13, at 57. 
54. Id., pt. I, at 45-46. 
55. See id. at 34-69. 
56. Id. at 5. 
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It is difficult to believe that the colonial volunteers of the eighteenth 
century had more in common with the pityable recruits of the con-
temporary European armies than with the militia levies of an earlier 
period; nevertheless, changes in the social composition of American 
forces between about 1650 and 1750 were in that direction .... 
Perhaps the vital change was in the tone of active service: with 
more social pariahs filling the ranks and military objectives less 
clearly connected to parochial interests, respectable men felt not so 
impelled by a sense of duty or guilt to take up arms. Only when a 
war approached totality (as in the Puritan crusade to Louisbourg 
in 1745, when an impressive percentage of Massachusetts manpower 
served in the land and sea forces) might the older attitude appear.67 
Only during the emergency of the Revolution was this trend re-
versed and compulsory service reintroduced. But every effort was 
made to fill the Continental Army quotas with nonvoters and non-
freeholders. 
Thus, the colonial experience showed only that (1) the primary 
compulsory aspect of the militia was the requirement to train; (2) 
the militia was fundamentally a defensive force; (3) continuous ser-
vice was required solely during periods of emergency; (4) service 
outside the colony was for outcasts only; and (5) the trend was 
away from compulsion in the years preceding the Revolution. It 
is therefore not surprising that the Selective Service System was 
obliged to admit that the "evidence reveals no preconstitutional 
systems valuable as models" for a universal draft.58 
F. Formation of the Constitution 
Another proposition which the Supreme Court relied upon to 
uphold the constitutionality of the draft related to the creation of 
a new government in 1787. The Court noted: 
When the Constitution came to be formed it may not be disputed 
that one of the recognized necessities for its adoption was the want 
of power in Congress to raise an army and the dependence upon 
the States for their quotas. In supplying the power it was manifestly 
intended to give it all and leave none to the States, since besides the 
delegation to Congress of authority to raise armies the Constitution 
prohibited the States, without the consent of Congress, from keeping 
troops in time of peace or engaging in war.59 
This statement, however, completely jumbles a very complicated 
political process which began before the Revolution. The experi-
57. Shy, A New Look at the Colonial Militia, 20 W11r. & MARY Q. 175, 182-83 (3d 
ser. 1963). 
58. 2 BACKGROUNDS, pt. 1, at 2. 
59. 245 U.S. at 381. 
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ence of the nation during the war and the dangers which the Con-
stitution-makers were concerned about cannot be telescoped in the 
offhand way that the Court attempted in the Selective Draft Law 
Cases. A more detailed analysis of that period is necessary. 
III. FORMULATION OF THE MILITARY CLAUSES OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
A. Political Background 
As noted above, widespread revulsion existed in the American 
colonies against a standing professional army. Almost all of the 
colonial statesmen were familiar with John Trenchard's essays, in 
which he repeatedly sought to demonstrate that "unhappy Nations 
have lost that precious Jewel Liberty ... [when] their Necessities 
or Indiscretion have permitted a Standing Army to be kept amongst 
them."60 The behavior of British troops in America during the ten 
years before the Revolution confirmed their worst fears of this 
danger. When British troops landed in Boston in 1768 Andrew 
Eliot, a leading statesman, ·wrote: "To have a standing army! Good 
God! What can be worse to a people who have tasted the sweets of 
libertyl"61 The Boston Massacre of 1770 and passage of the Quarter-
ing Act in 1774, which permitted the seizure of all buildings for 
the use of British troops, showed the colonists how accurate 
Trenchard had been. Indeed, one of the principal complaints 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence was that George III 
"Has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without 
the consent of our legislature," and "has effected to render the 
military independent of and superior to the civil power." 
As a result of the popular apprehensions about the military, the 
Continental Congress imposed strict control over the army that it 
organized to fight the Revolutionary War. Marcus Cunliffe, the 
distinguished English historian, has recently concluded that: "[T]he 
Continental Congress and the majority of Americans were some-
times more concerned with the danger of military overlordship than 
the danger of military inefficiency. From a combination of doctrine 
and habit they were reluctant to create their ovm version of a 
standing army."62 Examples of the distrust are plentiful; for instance, 
the Continental Congress insisted on regular reports from its com-
manding officer, George Washington, appointed his staff officers, and 
obliged him to consult with his generals in council before any major 
60. Trenchard, supra note 32, at 7. 
61. B. BAILYN, supra note 31, at 114. 
62. SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS 40-41 (1968). 
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military decision was made.63 Even in the midst of the war, Con-
necticut proposed that no peacetime army should be allowed. 6~ 
Furthermore, throughout the Revolution, Congress was never 
given any power to conscript soldiers directly into the Continental 
ranks. It had to rely primarily on the militia forces of the various 
states for the bulk of its fighting men. These forces were occasionally 
supplemented by enlistments; in June 1775, Congress permitted the 
enlistment of ten companies into the Continental Army to help 
New England militia forces around Boston. Although Congress 
later authorized increased musters, the enlistments, which ran gen-
erally for one year, always fell far below expectations. Short-term 
enlistments seemed an unnecessary leniency in the face of the na-
tional emergency, but as Professor Weigley has observed, "the basic 
cause of that policy was not Congressional folly but the caution 
necessary in creating a professional army among a people who had 
fled Europe partly to escape such armies."65 
When the states were called upon for levies or quotas of troops 
to meet specific campaign needs, the Continental Congress could 
not even compel them to deliver the number of troops requisi-
tioned; as might be expected, some were notoriously slow in provid-
ing manpower. George Washington suggested a direct draft system 
in 1777, 1778, and 1780, but "Congress did not dare invoke that 
instrument in any year of the war."66 The most that the Continental 
Congress was prepared to do was to urge the states to deliver their 
quotas "by draughts, or in any other manner they shall think 
proper."67 
However, the states were reluctant to rely upon conscription as 
a means of satisfying their congressional quotas. In part, this hesi-
tancy may have resulted from the feeling that the state militia 
systems contained safeguards for the individual which would be 
vitiated when state forces were put under the control of the central 
government. While the militia laws had a compulsory element in 
that all the male citizens had to enroll, train, and muster, the 
militiamen were usually enrolled with their friends under officers 
whom they had knmvn most of their lives. As noted above, generous 
provisions existed for paid substitutes to take the place of those 
63. R. WEIGLEY, supra note 44, at 30. 
64. M. CUNLIFFE, supra note 62, at 41. 
65. R:. WEIGLEY, supra note 44, at 38. 
66. Id. at 38. Professor Weigley states that "Washington ••• had to recognize that 
compulsory service ••• imposed on an unlucky portion of the national manpower was 
a policy the country was not likely to accept." Id. at 41. 
67. E. BURNEIT, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 390 (1941). 
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unwilling to serve, and the laws generally provided that the troops 
could not be sent outside their immediate borders without the 
consent of the legislature or the governor. The government leaders 
who controlled the militia were also subject to close electoral check. 
But none of these safeguards was present when a distant central 
authority in which the state had only one of thirteen voices decided 
whom or where the men had to fight. Thomas Jefferson expressed 
the prevailing sentiment in the states in a letter to John Adams, 
dated May 16, 1777: 
Our battalions for the Continental service was sometime ago so far 
filled as rendered the recommendation of a draught from the mili-
tia hardly requisite. And the more so as in this country it ever was 
the most unpopular and impracticable thing that could be at-
tempted. Our people under the monarchical government have learnt 
to consider it as the last of all oppressions.68 
. 
The Continental Congress not only had to rely on the states for 
quotas of troops for each campaign; it also had to come hat-in-hand 
to them for money to pay for the troops it enlisted and the supplies 
it required, since Congress had no power to tax. 69 Each state was 
obliged to pay a proportion of the general expenses, based on its 
population. The states moved as slowly to supply money as they 
did to furnish men for the Continental cause; by 1780, fifty million 
dollars in quotas remained unpaid, and Congress was powerless to 
demand compliance.70 
There was another reason why the states were not prepared to 
surrender control of their individual militias to the central au-
thorities: they wished to insure that they would have sufficient 
manpower to protect their own borders. The generous bounties 
offered by the states often meant that their ranks were adequate at 
the same time that the Continental army was experiencing the 
greatest difficulties recruiting troops. The state bounties "almost 
put a stop to enlistments in the Continental Army, for few engaged 
to serve three years ... when by volunteering to serve in the militia 
for a few months they received a bigger bounty and higher pay."71 
When the states did supply troops to the central government, they 
wanted to retain direct control over their own forces even in the 
field. Early in the war, for example, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts 
68. 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 18 ij. Boyd ed. 1950). 
69. See, e.g., J. Au.EN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 216 (1954): "Taxes bad come 
to be associated in patriot thinking with British tyranny, and in any event Congress 
lacked authority to collect them." 
70. J. MILLER, TllruMPH OF FREEDOM: 1775·1783, at 456-59 (1948). 
71. Id. at 238. 
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wrote to Elbridge Gerry that "the Militia of each Colony should 
be and remain under the sole Direction of its own Legislative 
which is and ought to be the sovereign and uncontroulable power 
within its own limits or Territory."72 Gerry agreed with Adams, 
and responded: "We already see the growing thirst for _Power in 
some of the inferior departments of the army, which ought to be 
regulated so far as to keep the military entirely subservient to the 
civil in every part of the United Colonies."73 This combination of 
Congress' dependence on the states for men and money and the 
states' constant attempts to interfere with the military authorities 
nearly drove George Washington to distraction. In 1780 he ·wrote, 
"I most firmly believe that the Independence of the United States 
never will be established until there is an Army on foot for the War; 
that [if we are to rely on occasional or annual levies] we must sink 
under the expence; and ruin must follow."74 • 
Thus, the American leaders emerged from the Revolution with 
four separate and conflicting ideas about organizing the military 
power of the United States: 
(1) Washington and other military leaders claimed that a fed-
eral, professional army, financed by the central government, had to 
be maintained.75 
(2) The political leaders continued to reflect the long-estab-
lished popular fear of a standing army. Samuel Adams indicated 
the prevalence of this view even after the war when he wrote that 
a "standing army, however necessary it may be at some times, is 
always dangerous to the liberties of the people. Soldiers are apt to 
consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of the citizens."76 
(3) The states continued to see the importance of maintaining 
as much control over their own militia as they possibly could. 
(4) The idea of a direct draft by a central government acting 
upon every citizen without the intervening authority of the state 
governments was firmly and totally rejected even at the darkest 
moments of the Revolution. 
The experience of the new nation immediately after the Revolu-
tionary War confirmed each of these notions. The deplorable state 
of the nation's finances made the members of the army uneasy 
about the bounties and pay allowances which had been promised 
72. E. BuRNETI, supra note 67, at 107. 
73. Id. 
74. 20 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 113-14 a. Fitzpatrick ed. 1937), 
75. See id. at 49-50: "Regular Troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern 
war •••• No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force." 
76. R. WEIGLEY, supra note 44, at 75. 
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them. In 1783, a group of officers in New Jersey drew up a list of 
complaints and hinted at mutiny if they were not fulfilled; later 
the same year eighty Pennsylvania soldiers marched from Lancaster 
to Philadelphia and barricaded the Continental Congress in the 
State House while demanding redress of their grievances.77 The 
apprehension that these actions caused led Congress to reduce the 
federal army to fewer than one hundred men. However, because 
of the need to defend the large Northwest section of the country 
and to garrison the various forts in Indian territory, the army was 
increased to approximately seven hundred men in 1785. When 
Shays' Rebellion broke out in 1786 in western Massachusetts-near 
the Springfield arsenal where the bulk of the Continental military 
stores were located-the army was increased to two thousand men. 
But the Massachusetts militia, and not the federal army, finally 
dispersed the rebels. To George Washington, Secretary of Wa_r 
Henry Knox, and others, the uprising demonstrated that the Con-
federation had become so feeble that it was unable to defend even 
its forts and arsenals.78 
The danger of popular uprisings such as Shays' Rebellion was 
one of the contributing factors leading to the call for the Constitu-
tional Convention in the spring of 1787. But, while the weakness 
of the federal authorities during the Revolution and Shays' Rebel-
lion disturbed many of the political leaders, they did not lose their 
well-established distrust of centralized government in general and of 
standing armies in particular.79 The attempt by king and parliament 
to rule from across the seas through a professional army was not to 
be duplicated in the United States. Again and again during this 
period the people expressed their fear of too strong a central au-
thority;80 the constant refrain that "the purse and the sword" were 
not to be put in the same hands meant that the power to tax and 
spend the public monies and an unlimited power to control the 
77. Id. at 76-79. 
78. See, e.g., Letter to Henry Knox, in THE WASHINGTON PAPERS 229-31 (S. Padover 
ed. 1958). See also R. WEIGLEY, supra note 44, at 84; w. "\\Tll.SON, GEORGE WASHINGTON 
256 (1897). 
79. See, e.g., J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 15 (1961): 
The suspicion of a standing army and the Antifederal determination to keep in 
local hands the control over the military had important consequences during and 
after the Revolution. Equally important in its effects was the conviction that the 
power to ta.x must be retained by the people. The long struggle with the gov-
ernors and the decade of controversy with king and parliament re-emphasized 
and intensified a doctrine shared by all Englishmen. 
80. For example, the town of "\Vest Springfield, Massachusetts, reminded its rep-
resentatives to guard against a Congress "which will form a design upon the liberties 
of the People & [it will not be] difficult to execute such a design when they have 
the absolute command of the navy, the army & the purse." Id. at 15-16. 
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military should not be combined. In general, it was felt that a new 
balance should be created, giving the federal authorities some 
power to raise money, to establish a uniform currency, and to exercise 
direct command over a small military force required for essential 
tasks. But under no circumstances did the people wish to invest a 
new centralized government, over which they had little control, 
with the power to build up a standing army like the one that had 
been the instrument of oppression before 1775. 
B. The Philadelphia Constitutional Convention 
The Philadelphia Convention commenced its proceedings on 
May 28, 1787. The presentation of credentials, election of a chair-
man and adoption of rules took place on the first and part of the 
second day; the main business of the Convention began on May 29 
with a speech by Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia and 
leader of the largest and most prestigious delegation. In his lengthy 
discourse, he enumerated the defects of the Articles of Confedera-
tion and commented upon the troubles then facing the separate 
states, including Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts, the "havoc of 
paper money," violated treaties, and commercial discord. He then 
introduced a fifteen-point plan for a new federal government which 
could correct these shortcomings.81 The Randolph or Virginia Plan 
became the basis for discussing changes in the Confederation and 
served as the skeleton of the new Constitution. Randolph must 
therefore be considered one of the chief architects of the Constitu-
tion. 
The very first defect of the government under the Articles of 
Confederation, according to Randolph, stemmed from its inability 
to defend itself against foreign invasion. As Madison reported his 
remarks, Randolph said the following: 
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: I. that the confedera-
tion produced no security agai[nst] foreign invasion; congress not 
being permitted to prevent a war not to support it by th[eir] own 
authority-Of this he cited many examples; most of wh[ich] tended 
to shew . . . that particular states might by their conduct provoke 
war without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being 
fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be success-
ful, and these could not be executed without money.s2 
James McHenry of Maryland took dmrn a more complete descrip-
tion of Randolph's speech. Elaborating on the enumerated defects, 
81. REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 7-14, 18-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [herein-
after Farrand]. 
82. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
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Randolph noted that the Confederation had no means of preventing 
the states from provoking foreign invasion. 83 The Confederation, 
he said, could not even support a war; the states were constantly in 
arrears to the federal treasury, and the journals of the Continental 
Congress showed that a series of feeble expedients had been employed 
in the attempt to raise money for the nation's defense. He continued: 
"What reason to expect that the treasury will be better filled in 
the future, or that money can be obtained under the present powers 
of Congress to support a war. Volunteers not to be depended on for 
such a purpose. Militia difficult to be collected and almost impossi-
ble to be kept in the field. Draughts stretch the strings of govern-
ment too violently to be adopted. Nothing short of a regular military 
force will answer the end of war, and this only to be created and 
supported by money.84 
Thus, at the very outset Randolph phrased the problem of provid-
ing an army in terms of money. Volunteer companies who would 
enlist without bounties-a system urged by many leaders and in-
cluded in some of the early military laws-were "not to be depended 
on." Since Congress had been totally dependent on the states for 
its revenues_:_including the money required for defense-a change 
was necessary in order to give the central government sufficient 
funds to support its army. The humiliating spectacle of Congress 
pleading with the states for money to defend the country could not 
continue; the "military force" to be raised under the new Constitu-
tion was one that had to be financed directly by the government. 
But Randolph, expressing the views of the strongest Federalist dele-
gates-those who wished to give the national government the widest 
powers-excluded the power to conscript as too dangerous: it 
"stretch[ed] the strings of government too violently to be adopted." 
The debates in the Convention, and those that took place after-
wards in the states, centered on the desirability of his fourth alter-
native, on "enlistments" which alone "could be successful."85 The 
question to which the political leaders addressed themselves was 
whether federal officials should have the funds and authority to pay 
for a professional volunteer army and the right to control such a 
force. 
Since the states had made every effort to retain command over 
their militia even when the troops were fighting under the Con-
83. Id. at 24-25: "If a state acts against a foreign power contrary to the laws of 
nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation] cannot punish that State, or compel 
its obedience to the treaty •••• It therefore cannot prevent a war." 
84. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 25-26. 
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tinental aegis, it was important to Randolph and other Federalists 
that direct control of a central army be in the hands of the new 
government. And, because the states had proved so reluctant to 
meet their quotas during the Revolution, it was important that the 
central authorities be free to enlist their forces directly from the 
people rather than being required to act through the states. But 
the delegates realized that they tread on dangerous ground by sug-
gesting the formation of such a force in peacetime. What could be 
"worse to a people who have tasted the sweets of liberty" than a 
standing army? However, the idea of a direct draft of citizens into 
the national military was rejected on the very first day of the Con-
vention as a matter too impossible to consider. No one-not the 
stanchest Federalist in the hall-was prepared to go that far. 
Fallowing discussion of the various elements of the Randolph 
Plan, which contained no specific military clause, attention focused 
on the alternative scheme introduced by William Paterson of New 
Jersey. It proposed that the executive "direct all military opera-
tions; provided that none of the persons composing the federal 
Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops, so as 
personally to conduct any" enterprise as General or in any other 
capacity."86 The Committee of Detail, assigned to prepare the actual 
words of the new Constitution, in its fourth working draft of late 
July, suggested that the new government be empowered to "make 
war," "raise armies," and "equip Fleets."87 For unknown reasons, 
the seventh draft recommended that "the Legislature of U.S. shall 
have the exclusive power-of raising a military Land Force-of 
equipping a Navy";88 but the ninth draft returned to the original 
phraseology, "to make war; to raise armies, to build and equip 
Fleets." Shortly thereafter the Convention accepted a motion to 
change "raise armies" to "raise and support armies" and "build 
and equip" a navy to "provide and maintain."89 
At this point the Convention encountered its first real difficulties 
with the Government's power to raise and support armies; the key 
issue was again the historic fear of standing armies. Madison had 
already warned: 
A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not 
long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense agst. 
foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyr~nny at 
home . . .. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the 
86. Id. at 244. 
87. 2 id. at 143. 
88. Id. at 158. 
89. Id. at 323. 
June 1969] Conscription and the Constitution 1515 
pretext of defending, have enslaved the people. It is perhaps ques-
tionable, whether the best concerted system of absolute power in 
Europe ed. maintain itself, in a situation, where no alarms of ex-
ternal danger ed. tame the people to the domestic yoke. 90 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts also was greatly concerned about 
the military clause. He acknowledged that the chief defect under 
the Articles of Confederation was the fact that the "existing Congs. 
is so constructed that it cannot of itself maintain an army.''91 But, 
while many Antifederalists later advocated an absolute prohibition 
on a standing army in time of peace, Gerry was prepared to grant a 
limited power to Congress in this area.92 His solution was to allow 
Congress to use funds for maintaining a specific number of troops: 
"He proposed that there should not be kept up in time of peace 
more than ___ thousand troops. His idea was that the blank 
should be filled with two or three thousand."93 Discussion continued 
with several members offering solutions to this problem, but ulti-
mately no limit was imposed. 
The Convention hedged even the limited power that it granted 
to buy an army through enlistments by insisting that "no appropria-
tion of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two 
years."9~ By making the army return to the people-the legislative 
branch-for funds every two years, the delegates sought to minimize 
the dangers of tyranny. They considered this method of control 
more appropriate than a restriction on the number of troops or 
a ban on any peacetime establishment.95 Later, George Mason intro-
duced a resolution to preface the militia sections of the Constitution 
with a clause stating "that the liberties of the people may be better 
secured against the danger of standing armies in time of peace."96 
The motion was seconded by Randolph, and James Madison spoke 
in favor of it: "It did not restrain Congress from establishing a 
military force in time of peace if found necessary; and as armies 
90. I id. at 465. George Mason of Virginia also expressed "hope there would be 
no standing army in time of peace, unless it might be for a few garrisons. The 
Militia ought therefore to be the more effectually prepared for the public defense.'' 
2 id. at 326. 
91. Id. at 329. 
92, Cf. id.: "The people were jealous on this bead, and great opposition to the 
plan would spring from such an omission. • • • He thought an army dangerous in 
time of peace & could never consent to a power to keep up an indefinite number." 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 508. 
95. Elbridge Gerry objected even to that clause since it "implied there was to be a 
standing army which he inveigled against as dangerous to liberty, as unnecessary even 
for so great an extent of Country as this. and if necessary, some restriction on the 
number & duration ought to be provided." Id. at 509. 
96. Id. at 617. 
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in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil, it is well to 
discountenance them by the Constitution, as far as will consist with 
the essential power of the Govt. on that head."97 The motion, 
however, did not pass. 
In summary, article I, clause 12 gave Congress a power it lacked 
under the Confederation-the unlimited authority to use federal 
funds to enlist an army. The power was granted because, as 
Randolph had observed, the militias were "difficult to be collected 
and ... kept in the field" and because no other alternative seemed 
feasible. But the historic fears of a standing army led the delegates 
to limit the power at what they considered its source-by restricting 
the funds available to maintain an army. Clause 12 answered the 
concern of those who wished the new government to have some 
authority to keep up some kind of independent military force which 
would be used for specific national purposes. But it was hardly a 
blank check for the government to use all authority to raise any 
forces it desired in any manner it chose. Certainly it did not grant 
the power to draft; even the Federalists believed that such au-
thority would "stretch the strings of government too violently to 
be adopted." 
The manner in which the militias were organized confirms the 
idea that the body of state militias consisting of the citizens at large, 
and not a national professional standing army, was intended to be 
the main military force of the United States. When Randolph in-
troduced the original Virginia Plan, he suggested that "the national 
legislature" should have authority "to call forth the force of the 
Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty 
under the articles thereof."98 The issue was proposed three times 
with one change: "the federal Executive," said the advocates of 
this modification, "shall be authorized to call forth ye power of the 
Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to 
enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts, or an Observance 
of such Treaties" that were passed by Congress.99 
The Convention was caught between two conflicting impera-
tives. On the one hand, they did not want the national authorities 
to coerce citizens ·with a standing army; on the other hand, if the 
only alternative power, the militia, were used as the primary arm of 
the United States, would it not then become a mere tool of the fed-
eral government? Hamilton, indeed, had thought it desirable for 
97. Id. 
98. 1 id. at 21. 
99. Id. at 244-45. 
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"the Militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direc-
tion of the United States."100 But this idea, never formally submitted, 
was hardly acceptable. The states would not give up complete con-
trol over their mm forces. The solution came in one of the many 
compromises made during the Convention. The Committee of 
Detail in reporting the third draft of the Constitution provided that 
no state shall keep a naval or land force, "Militia excepted to be 
disciplined, etc. according to the Regulations of the U.S."101 This 
language was elaborated by James Wilson, who proposed a clause 
stating that the legislature of the United States "shall possess the 
exclusive Right of establishing the Government and Discipline of 
the Militia-and of ordering the Militia of any State to any Place 
within U.S."102 By the time that the ninth draft was completed, the 
clause provided that Congress would have the power "to (make 
laws for) call(ing) forth the Aid of the Militia, in order to execute 
the Laws of the Union, (to) enforce Treaties, (to) suppress Insur-
rections, and repel invasions."103 With the deletion of the reference 
to treaties,104 this became clause 15 of article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution. 
In the debate on the militia power, the delegates were quite 
concerned that there should be national uniformity in the regula-
tion of the militia.105 The matter was debated on August 18, 1787, 
with Oliver Ellsworth insisting that the whole authority of the 
militia should not be taken away from the states. Roger Sherman, 
John Dickinson, and George Mason attempted to work out a com-
promise allowing the government to exercise control over a certain 
portion of the Militia, one fourth to one tenth. Madison advocated 
national control, arguing: "If the States would trust the Genl. 
Govt. with a power over the public treasure, they would from the 
same consideration of necessity grant it the direction of the public 
force."106 Moreover, Madison asserted, only the federal government 
had a full view of the general situation and could mobilize and 
100. Id. at 293. 
101. 2 id. at 135. 
102. Id. at 159. 
103. Id. at 168. 
104. It is interesting to note that after the deletion of the phrase referring to 
treaties, the three instances in which the militia could be called out corresponded al-
most exactly to the provisions of the English Agreement of the People passed by the 
House of Commons in 1648. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra. 
105. For example, General C. C. Pinckney mentioned a case that had occurred 
during the war in which dissimilarity in the militia of different states "had produced 
the most serious mischiefs. Uniformity was essential. The States would never keep up 
a proper discipline of their militia." 2 Farrand 330. 
106, Id. at 332. 
1518 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1493 
marshal the necessary forces to meet any contingency. General C. C. 
Pinckney, on the basis of his military experience, had very "scanty 
faith in Militia. There must be also a real military force .... The 
United States had been making an experiment without it, and we 
see the consequence in their rapid approaches toward anarchy," a 
reference to Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts the prior year.107 
Roger Sherman, however, insisted that the states would need their 
own militia for defense against invasion and insurrection and for 
enforcing obedience to their own laws. The matter was referred to 
a select committee at that point. 
The debate on the matter was resumed on August 23, 1787. The 
select committee had proposed that Congress be given the power 
"to make laws for organizing, arming, disciplining the Militia, and 
for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service 
of the U.S. reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of 
the officers, and authority of training the militia according to the 
discipline prescribed."108 Once again Elbridge Gerry attacked the 
whole notion of giving the central government power over the 
militia109 while Madison insisted that uniformity was necessary 
because the states neglected their militia. "The Discipline of the 
Militia is evidently a National concern," Madison said, "and ought 
to be provided for in the National Constitution."110 The Conven-
tion passed the proposal by a vote of nine to two, agreeing to a 
provision which allowed Congress "[t]o make laws for organizing 
arming & disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of 
them as may be employed in the service of the U.S."111 During the 
debate on the question whether the states should be free to appoint 
officers of the militia, Madison observed: 
As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is neces-
sary to guard agst. it by sufficient powers to the Common Govt. and 
as the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is 
best to prevent them by an effectual provision for a good Militia.112 
A clause allowing the states to appoint all of their officers was 
passed, and, with minor changes made by the Committee on Style, 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 384-85. 
109. "This power in the U.S. as explained is making the States drill-sergeants. He 
had as lief let the Citizens of Massachusetts be disarmed, as to take the command 
from the States, and subject them to the Genl. Legislature. It would be regarded as 
a system of Despotism." Id. at 385 
110. Id. at 387. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 388. 
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it remains in the Constitution substantially as recommended by 
the Committee of Detail.113 
The debate over the organization of the militia again points out 
how unthinkable it was to the framers that the central government 
could have any direct power to draft individual citizens into the 
general army. Only with the greatest reluctance did the delegates 
allow the central government to call the militia into service for 
specific purposes. The reason was obvious--a tyrannical central gov-
ernment with a large army would be able to destroy the hard-won 
liberties of the people. On the other hand, some central control was 
necessary to mobilize the militia for defense purposes and to compel 
obedience to the laws. But all the restrictions which the Convention 
imposed on this power, the fact that the states would be able to 
appoint the officers and train the militia, and the fact that the 
general government could control the militia only for the purpose 
of executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections, and 
repelling invasions indicate that the framers were quite concerned 
about the danger of the central government using its military forces 
to suppress the freedoms of the people. 
After circumscribing the central government's power to draw 
the militia into federal service with such careful restrictions, the 
delegates could not possibly have allowed the federal government to 
exercise direct control over the citizens by permitting a draft into 
the regular army. The matter was so impossible to imagine, given 
the circumstances and ideological climate of the times, that no 
voice was raised against it. The only mention of the draft at the 
Convention was by Edmund Randolph, a leading Federalist figure 
and proponent of the Constitution, who denied that the new gov-
ernment should have that power. It is inconceivable that stanch 
Antifederalists like Elbridge Gerry, who strongly opposed the crea-
tion of any standing army, would not have raised the loudest protest 
about any general power to draft by the federal government if they 
had thought that it was contained within the general grant of 
authority "to raise and support armies." All that was given by the 
grant, therefore, was the power to organize and enlist a federal, 
professional army which-the delegates thought-would consist of 
a limited number of garrison troops. That power was given grudg-
ingly, only in the light of the severe hardship Congress had experi-
enced during the Revolution in depending solely on the states for 
manpower and military supplies. But the door was opened for that 
limited purpose only. 
IHI. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
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Differences in the language of the Constitution support this 
interpretation. When the word "armies" is used in article I, section 
8, it does not encompass any organized body of the military; rather, 
it refers to an "army" in eighteenth century usage, a force far dif-
ferent from the "militia." The former existed as a highly specialized 
instrument of the central government, a body of trained and dis-
ciplined troops whose purpose was to protect the central government 
and execute its policies. The militia, on the other hand, was a quite 
different sort of military establishment, comprehending the whole 
mass of citizen-soldiers. Its principal function was to safeguard free 
men against foreign and domestic enemies-not the least of which 
was government itself. The idea that citizens have an obligation to 
bear arms for a national authority, and work against their own 
most profound interests, never occurred to the framers; it would 
have been a contradiction to their entire political heritage, mani-
festly inconsistent with their sense of the delicate balance between 
liberty and power, between the appetite for oppression and the 
instinct for resistance. If the citizen had any military obligation, 
it was to his local militia, where he and his compatriots might have 
to meet the advance of standing armies in the employ of even their 
own government. 
C. The Federalist Papers 
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton devoted a substantial 
portion of The Federalist Papers to the military clauses.114 The 
picture they drew of the military establishment confirms the fore-
going interpretation of the structure that was delineated in the 
Philadelphia Convention. In the first place, the main military force 
was to be the militia; the professional army that was to be raised 
and controlled by the central government had limited functions. 
Hamilton's description of the English structure, which he used as 
a model for the American system, is illustrative: 
A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, till the 
militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has been 
deemed requisite [in England] .... 
If we are wise enough to preserve the union, we may for ages 
enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation .... Ex-
tensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be neces-
sary to our security.115 
Besides bearing the initial shock of any sudden invasion until the 
114. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 8, 23-29, 41. 
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 48-49 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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militia could be mobilized, the regular army troops would guard 
the frontiers, "against the ravages and depredations of the Indians": 
These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments 
from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the govern-
ment. The first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be per-
nicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged 
from their occupations and families to perform that most disagree-
able duty in times of profound peace_. And if they could be prevailed 
upon, or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent 
rotation of service and the loss of labor, and disconcertion of the 
industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objec-
tions to the scheme. It would be as burthensome and injurious to 
the public, as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of per-
manent corps in the pay of government amounts to a standing army 
in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being 
small.116 
Thus Hamilton believed that the citizens at large would be en-
rolled in the militia while the regular army would consist of pro-
fessionals enlisted for long periods. His statement is incompatible 
with any notion that the citizens could be taken directly into the 
regular army by a draft, "dragged from their occupations and 
families" in a "frequent rotation of service" to perform "disagree-
able duty" in Indian territory. 
As the preceding quotation indicates, Hamilton distinguished 
often between the citizens at large and the regular army. He noted 
that the art of war had progressed to the point at which specializa-
tion was necessary,117 and that the people no longer wished to devote 
themselves to the military arts: 
The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed 
in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agri-
culture and commerce are incompatible with the condition of a 
nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of 
those [Greek] republics. The means of revenue, which have been so 
greatly multiplied by the encrease of gold and silver, and of the arts 
of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of 
modern times, ... have produced an intire revolution in the system 
of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the 
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 156-57 a. Cooke ed. 1961). 
117. Sec, e.g., THE FEDERAUST No. 25, at 162 CT, Cooke ed. 1961): "The steady 
operations of war against a regular and disciplined army, can only be successfully con-
ducted by a force of the same kind .••• \Var, like most other things, is a science to 
be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice." 
Madison makes the same point in THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 270 CT, Cooke ed. 1961): 
"If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambi-
tion or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of 
its enterprizes to take corresponding precautions." 
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body of the citizens, the inseparable companion of frequent hos-
tility.118 
In a nation such as the United States, which was not subject to 
invasions or internal strife, armies would be small and the citizens 
would not be "habituated to look up to the military power for 
protection, or to submit to its oppressions"; instead, they would 
recognize professional armies as a necessary evil and would "stand 
ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the 
prejudice of their rights."119 
Hamilton returned to this point in The Federalist No. 29, in 
which he again argued that a strong militia was the best protection 
against the dangers of a standing army.120 Madison concurred in 
The Federalist No. 46: 
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country be 
formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the Frederal Gov-
ernment; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State 
Governments with the people on their side would be able to repel 
the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best 
computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does 
not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or 
one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This propor-
tion would not yield in the United States an army of more than 
twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a 
militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in 
their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fight-
ing for their common liberties, and united and conducted by gov-
ernments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be 
doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be con-
quered by such a proportion of regular troops.121 
These statements show that Hamilton and Madison envisioned the 
regular army that Congress could raise as a small professional force, 
distinct from the citizens at large, and possessing limited functions 
and responsibilities. The yeomen of the country, organized in their 
militia, would be called out for the specific purposes mentioned in 
the Constitution and would act as a constant check on the govern-
ment and its regular army. But the idea that citizens could be im-
ll8. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 47 G· Cooke ed. 1961). 
ll9. Id. at 47-48. 
120. According to Hamilton, a well-trained militia " 'will not only lessen the call 
for military establishments; but if circumstances should at any time oblige the gov· 
ernment to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to 
the liberties of the people, while there is a large body of citizens little if at all in• 
ferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their 
own rights and those of their fellow citizens.'" At 184 G· Cooke ed. 1961). 
121. At 321 a. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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pressed into that army against their wills is totally inconsistent with 
the military structure outlined by the two Federalist leaders. No 
direct comment on this question appears in The Federalist Papers 
because it was entirely alien to the thinking of the time. 
To both Hamilton and Madison, the problem of raising an 
army was simply a matter of raising the revenue to support the 
army, just as Randolph stated on the first day of the Philadelphia 
Convention.122 Since the Confederation lacked such a power, both 
men wanted to be sure that the new government would have in-
dependent means of securing funds for defense and would be given 
the authority to gather and support its own forces; but clearly 
nothing more was supposed to be granted by the Constitution. It 
is true that Hamilton was anxious to insure that the various limita-
tions on the military power which existed under the Confederation 
or were suggested at the Convention would not be imposed, and 
at one point he used rather sweeping language to argue that posi-
tion: 
The authorities essential to the care of the comm.on defence are 
these-to raise armies-to build and equip fleets-to prescribe rules 
for the government of both-to direct their operations-to provide 
for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation: 
Because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety 
of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent & variety of the 
means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances 
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason 
no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to 
which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be co-
extensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; 
and ought to be under the direction of the same councils, which are 
appointed to preside over the common defence.123 
These remarks are often cited to show the broad reach of the war 
power, and to support the assertion that this power necessarily in-
cludes the ability to conscript. However, those who rely on this 
language seldom note that Hamilton explains his meaning in the 
same paper. Two paragraphs after the quoted passage he states that 
122. In Tm: FEDERALIST No. 41, at 276 ij. Cooke ed. 1961), Madison wrote: "The 
Power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be 
exerted in the national defence, is properly thrown into the same class with it." At 
the beginning of THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 187-88 ij. Cooke ed. 1961), the first paper 
after his discussion of the military clause, Hamilton stated: "It has been already ob-
served that the Fcederal Government ought to possess the power of providing for 
the support of the national forces: in which proposition was intended to be included 
the expence of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other ex-
pences in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations." 
123. THE FEDEAALIST No. 23, at 147 ij. Cooke ed. 1961). 
1524 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1493 
"unless it can be shewn, that the circumstances which may affect 
the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits" 
there should be "no limitation of that authority, which is to provide 
for the defence and. protection of the community, in any manner 
essential to its efficacy; that is in any matter essential to the f orma-
tion, direction or support of the NATIONAL FORCES."124 In 
other words, Hamilton is simply declaring that any traditional or 
accepted way of forming a professional army (in terms of the 
number or manner of enlisting men) or directing it (through any 
command structure decided by the authorities) or supporting it 
(by any system of pay scales deemed desirable) must be allowed. His 
statements can be understood only as a response to the various 
restrictions on a federal army suggested by the Antifederalists: a 
ban on any peacetime establishment, an absolute numerical limit 
on the peacetime army, or a short-term period of enlistment for 
professional soldiers. These were the limitations that he wished 
to avoid and his expansive language was offered to counter these 
attacks on the military power. Since even the most violent Anti-
federalist never claimed that the new government would have the 
power to conscript,125 his statements were not directed to that 
problem in any way. 
The interpretation is confirmed still later in The Federalist No. 
23. In denigrating the old revolutionary military system, Hamilton 
argues: 
We must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions 
as .•. impracticable and unjust. The result from all this is, that 
the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to 
build and equip fleets, and to raise the revenues, which will be re-
quired for the formation and support of an army and navy, in 
the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other govem-
ments.126 
By "levy[ing] troops" Hamilton meant federalizing the state militia 
and bringing them into federal service by executive decree instead 
of requesting the states to furnish them under the quota system. 
Moreover, as stated earlier,127 no government in the world had 
exercised a general power to conscript its citizens into its regular 
army-other than as punishment or as a means of removing paupers 
from the streets-at the time that the Constitution was drafted. 
Thus, it is clearly illogical to interpret Hamilton's statements as 
124. Id. at 147-48. 
125. See generally text accompanying notes 128-74 infra. 
126. At 148-49 Q'. Cooke ed. 1961). 
127. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra. 
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advocacy for a power beyond that which any other contemporary 
government had ever asserted; at most he must have been arguing 
only that the federal government should be given the same general 
powers which other states possessed, the ability to use unlimited 
funds to buy an army through enlistments. The juxtaposition of 
his remarks about the system of quotas and requisitions with a dis-
cussion of the power to raise troops shows the intent of his state-
ment: the federal government should be able to compel the states 
to supply their militias and to enlist men directly without the 
interposition of the states. 
In summary, The Federalist Papers must be interpreted in 
terms of the Confederation's inability to control the military and 
the Antifederalist arguments which Hamilton and Madison sought 
to counter. The broad language in The Federalist Papers met both 
of these problems. They are answers to specific questions raised at 
the time about the proper organization of the armed forces. But 
both men make clear in their remarks about the function and 
composition of the professional army that it would not be composed 
of the citizens at large. 
D. State Ratifying Conventions 
The arguments in the various state ratifying conventions also 
reflect strong popular sentiment against a standing army of any 
kind. Not only those attacking the Constitution but also some of 
its most forceful defenders repeated the maxim that a standing 
army was a potential instrument of tyranny although it was neces-
sary to defend the nation against hostile invaders.128 The grudging 
support which the military clauses received from those who must 
be regarded as its principal defenders is a good indication that 
everyone expected the standing army to be a small professional 
volunteer army and as Hamilton indicated, a mere holding force 
until the militia could be mobilized. Further evidence that none 
of the founders thought power had been granted to conscript into 
a federal army is the fact that even the most vociferous Antifederal-
ists never raised this spectre in attacking the new Constitution.129 
They objected to the federal government's power to enforce its 
laws directly on the citizens of the states, to levy taxes upon them, 
or to have federal courts exercise jurisdiction over them, and they. 
undoubtedly would have made reference to the power to conscript 
if they had had any idea that such a grant of authority was written 
128. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 2'71 a. Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton). 
129. See generally text accompanying notes 128-74 infra. 
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into the new instrument. The absence of any claims in this area is 
strong evidence that the power was not present, since the Anti-
federalists drew on every conceivable source, particularly when the 
military clauses were in issue, to undermine ratification. 
Indeed, many of the arguments which the Antifederalists as-
serted against the new Constitution, and many of the amendments 
which were recommended to correct alleged defects, were premised 
on the implicit assumption that the power to draft did not exist. 
For example, the delegates in a number of state conventions, pro-
posed that the Constitution be amended to limit the term of 
enlistments for all members of the federal army.130 If they thought 
that the federal government could conscript directly, they would 
surely have included a limit on the conscription term as well. In 
another state some delegates wished to include a conscientious ob-
jector clause in the Constitution. But they mentioned this problem 
not in connection with the power to raise a federal army but only 
in discussing the militia clauses131-a clear indication of the belief 
that compulsory service was possible only in the state militia. An 
examination of this pattern in the various state conventions confirms 
the universality of these sentiments. 
I. Opposition to Standing Armies 
Perhaps the most articulate attack upon the new Constitution 
was made by Luther Martin, one of Maryland's delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention. He delivered an address entitled "The 
Genuine Information" to the Maryland legislature on November 
29, 1787, describing the proceedings in Philadelphia. His report, 
which ran for approximately forty printed pages in Elliot's Debates, 
was the most detailed Antifederalist challenge to the new Constitu-
tion. When he addressed himself to the section of the Constitution 
dealing with Congress' power to raise an army, Martin had the 
following comments: 
[T]he Congress have also a power given them to raise and support 
armies, without any limitation as to numbers and without any re-
striction in time of peace. Thus, sir, this plan of government, in-
stead of guarding against a standing army,-that engine of arbitrary 
power, which has so often and so successfully been used for the sub-
version of freedom,-has, in its formation, given it an express and 
constitutional sanction, and hath provided for its introduction. Nor 
could this be prevented. I took the sense of the Convention on a 
proposition, by which the Congress should not have power, in time 
130. See pt. 4 infra. 
llll. See text accompanying noie§ 163·64 infra. 
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of peace, to keep imbodied more than a certain number of regular 
troops, that number to be ascertained by what should be considered 
a respectable peace establishment. This proposition was rejected by 
a majority, it being their determination that the power of Congress 
to keep up a standing army, even in peace, should only be re-
strained by their will and pleasure.132 
The Antifederalists in Massachusetts took a similar view, placing 
particular emphasis on the danger inherent in the fact that the 
new Constitution granted Congress "the power of the purse and 
the sword.''133 General Thompson, a strong Antifederalist figure, 
cited the English experience, saying: "Congress will have power 
to keep standing armies. The great Mr. Pitt says, standing armies 
are dangerous-keep your militia in order .... "134 And, in Penn-
sylvania, minority delegates who voted against ratification issued 
an address declaring their "Reasons of Dissent"; one of the principal 
grounds which they specified was the fear of the central govem-
ment' s military power: 
A standing army in the hands of a government placed so inde-
pendent of the people, may be made a fatal instrument to overturn 
the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of 
the most oppressive taxes, and to carry into execution the most ar-
bitrary measures. An ambitious man who may have the army at his 
devotion, may step up into the throne, and seize upon absolute 
power.135 
On the other hand, the delegates in many states recognized the 
need for a small peacetime standing army, primarily as a frontier 
garrison force; but they frequently emphasized the limited nature 
of this exception. James Iredell, a leading advocate of ratification 
in North Carolina and later an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court, expressed the hope that "in time of peace, there will not be 
occasion, at anytime, but for a very small number of forces.''136 
Similarly, James Wilson of Pennsylvania supported the immediate 
creation of a small federal army to guard the frontier as a means 
of avoiding the possibility that a large force would be needed later; 
in his view, "[ o ]ur enemies, finding us invulnerable, will not attack 
us; and we shall thus prevent the occasion for larger standing 
. armies."137 In James Madison's opinion, however, "the most effectual 
132. 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 370-71 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES]. 
133. 2 DEBATES 57: "Congress, with the purse-strings in their hands, will use the 
sword with a witness." 
134. Id. at 80. 
135, J. MCMASTER 8e F. STONE, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-
1788, at 480 (1888). 
136. 4 DEBATES 96. 
137. 2 id. at 521. 
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way" to avoid standing armies was to strengthen the state forces 
and "to give the general government full power to call forth the 
militia, and exert the whole natural strength of the Union."138 
In the New York ratifying convention several amendments were 
proposed which indicate the kind of army that contemporary states-
men thought would be organized by the federal government. John 
Lansing recommended the adoption of a clause which provided 
"That no standing army, or regular troops, shall be raised, or kept 
up, in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of the mem-
bers of both houses present."139 Alexander Hamilton also proposed 
an amendment that was substantially similar.140 An amended version 
of Lansing's proposal was eventually adopted by the New York 
convention, 141 and, in a preamble to the ratifying document, the 
delegates proclajmed: 
['I]hat a well-regulated militia, including the body of the people 
capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of 
a free state. 
That standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to lib-
erty, and ought not to be kept up, except in cases of necessity .... 142 
Proposals to amend the Constitution by adding a prohibition on 
standing armies continued even after ratification and were frequently 
supported by Thomas Jefferson in his correspondence.143 
As these comments demonstrate, the leaders who ratified the 
Constitution believed that the militia-the armed body of all the 
citizens-was the prime source of the nation's defense, and that 
only a small professional army with limited functions could be 
created by the federal government. This contrast between a stand-
ing army and "the people" was often quite explicit in the debates 
of the Virginia convention,144 which were recorded more extensively 
138. 3 id. at 381. 
139. 2 id. at 406. 
140. 5 PAPERS OF Al.ExANDER HAMILTON 185 (H. Syrett&: J. Cooke ed. 1962): "That 
no Appropriation of money in time of Peace for the Support of an Army shall be by 
Less than two thirds of the Representatives and Senators present." 
141. 1 DEBATES 330. 
142. Id. at 328. 
143. See, e.g., 13 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 442-43 a. Boyd ed. 1956): 
I sincerely rejoice at the acceptance of our new constitution by nine states. It js 
a good canvas, on which some strokes only want retouching. What these are, I 
think are sufficiently manifested by the general voice from North to South, which 
calls for a bill of rights. It seems pretty generally understood that this should go 
to Juries, Habeas corpus, Standing armies •.•• If no check can be found to keep 
the number of standing troops within safe bounds ••• abandon them altogether, 
discipline well the militia, and guard the magazines with them. More than 
magazine-guards will be useless if few, and dangerous if many • • • • 
See also 12 id. 440; 14 id. 678. 
144. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES 425: "Mr. GEORGE MASON •••. I ask, Who are the 
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than those of any other state. James Madison made a particularly 
forceful assertion of this distinction in defending the federal govern-
ment's power to call out the militia: 
If resistance should be made to the execution of the laws . . . it 
ought to be overcome. This could be done only in two ways--
either by regular forces or by the people .... If insurrections should 
arise, or invasion should take place, the people ought unquestion-
ably to be employed, to suppress and repel them, rather than a 
standing army.145 
Randolph concurred in the judgment that primary military duties 
should fall upon "the people" rather than a standing army; in his 
interpretation of the Constitution, defense was "left to the militia, 
who will suffer if they become the instruments of tyranny."146 
2. Comparison with the Military Powers of the 
Confederation and Other Countries 
Another indication that the Constitution did not purport to 
give the federal government the power of conscription can be 
found in the frequent comparisons made in state ratifying conven-
tions between the new military system and the one established 
under the Articles of Confederation. In response to the Antifederal-
ists' expressions of apprehension about standing armies, supporters 
of the Constitution argued that the military clauses were merely a 
recognition of the practices of the former government; thus, Chan-
cellor Robert R. Livingston147 of New York, James Wilson148 and 
Thomas McKean149 of Pennsylvania, and Alexander Hamilton150 
militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers." See also 
id. at !179, !185. 
145. Id. at !178. 
146. Id. at 401. 
147, 2 DEBATES 278-79: 
But, say the gentlemen, our present Congress have not the same powers. I 
answer, they have the very same. Congress have the powers of making war and 
peace, of levying money and raising men • . . • 
We are told that this Constitution gives Congress the power over the purse 
and the sword. Sir, have not all good governments this power? Nay, does any-
one doubt that, under the old Confederation, Congress holds the purse and the 
sword? How many loans did they procure which we are bound to pay! How 
many men did they raise whom we are bound to maintain! 
148. Id. at 468: "Another objection is, 'that Congress may borrow money, keep 
up standing armies and command the militia.' The present Congress possesses the 
power of borrowing money and of keeping up standing armies." 
149. Id. at 5!17: "The power of raising and supporting armies is not only neces-
sary, but is enjoyed by the present Congress, who also judge of the expediency or 
necessity of keeping them up.'' 
150. Id. at !152: "A government, to act with energy, should have the possession 
of all its revenues to answer present purposes. The principle for which I contend is 
recognized in all its extent by our old Constitution. Congress is authorized to raise 
troops, to call for supplies without limitation and to borrow money to any amount." 
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all asserted that the power to control the purse and the sword which 
was granted by the new instrument was essentially the same as that 
existing in the Confederation. That is, many defenders of the Con-
stitution felt that the answer to the problem of national defense 
lay in the explicit grant of power to raise money for enlisting an 
army, and not in any system so radical as direct conscription into 
the federal forces. This distinction is particularly clear in James 
Wilson's discussion of Shays' Rebellion: 
It may be frequently necessary to keep up standing armies in time 
of peace. The present Congress have experienced the necessity, and 
seven hundred troops are just as much a standing army as seventy 
thousand. . . . They may go further, and raise an army, without 
communicating to the public the purpose for which it is raised. 
On a particular occasion they did this. ·when the commotion ex-
isted in Massachusetts, they gave orders for enlisting an additional 
body of two thousand men.151 
In addition to comparing the new government's authority to 
that of the old Confederation, some delegates also claimed that the 
military power of the United States was to be the same as that 
practiced by other nations-and, as noted above,152 no nation prac-
ticed conscription at the time that the Constitution was adopted. 
Thus, when Thomas Dawes of Massachusetts cited the English ex-
perience with standing armies under Charles II, James II, and 
William III as support for the proposition that national legislatures 
have the inherent authority "to raise armies,"153 he must have been 
referring to the kind of professional volunteer army which Great 
Britain maintained throughout the eighteenth century. James Wil-
son's analogy to foreign governments also underscores what the 
delegates meant when they passed upon the power to "raise and 
support armies": "I have taken some pains to inform myself how 
the other governments of the world stand with regard to this power, 
and the result of my inquiry is, that there is not one which has 
not the power of raising and keeping up standing armies."11i4 
3. Amendments on Military Jurisdiction 
The possibility that citizens could be tried by courts-martial 
was of central concern to many statesmen of the time who thought 
that trial by jury was the individual's greatest safeguard against 
tyranny. Luther Martin, the Maryland Antifederalist, expressed 
considerable concern over this problem, but he mentioned it only 
151. Id. at 520-21. 
152. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra. 
153. 2 DEBATES 97-98. 
154. Id. at 520. 
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with respect to the militia clause, and not in connection with the 
provision for federal armies: 
It was thought that not more than a certain part of the militia of 
any one state ought to be obliged to march out of the same ... at 
any one time, without the consent of the legislature of such state. 
This amendment I endeavored to obtain; but . . . it was not 
adopted. As it now stands, the Congress will have the power, if they 
please, to march the whole militia of Maryland to the remotest part 
of the Union, and to keep them in service as long as they think 
proper, without being in any respect dependent upon the govern-
ment of Maryland for this unlimited exercise of power over its 
citizens--all of whom, from the lowest to the greatest, may, during 
such service, be subjected to military law, and tied up and whipped 
.•. like the meanest of slaves.155 
According to Martin, who was a delegate to the Philadelphia Con-
vention, it was the federal government's power to call out the militia 
that created the danger of military control over Maryland citizens; 
he did not even mention this problem when he discussed the con-
gressional power to raise and support armies. It seems probable 
that his failure to mention the issue in the latter context was due 
to the unarticulated assumption that the regular army would be 
composed of volunteers who would waive their right to jury trial 
by enlisting. 
It is apparent that the members of the Maryland convention 
shared Martin's assumption, for they proposed an amendment pro-
viding "That the militia shall not be subjected to martial law, 
except in time of war, invasion or rebellion."156 According to the 
Amending Committee: 
This provision to restrain the powers of Congress over the militia, 
although by no means so ample as that provided by the Magna 
Carta and the other great fundamental and Constitutional laws of 
Great Britain . . . yet it may prove an inestimable check; for all 
other provisions in favor of the rights of men would be vain and 
nugatory, if the power of subjecting all men, able to bear arms, to 
martial law at any moment should remain vested in Congress.157 
A similar amendment was proposed in Virginia.168 It hardly seems 
possible that the delegates in these two states would be concerned 
about the danger that state citizens forced into the militia could 
155. 1 id. at 371. 
156. 2 id. at 552. 
157. Id. 
158. 3 id. at 660: 
That each state respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing, arm-
ing, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect 
to provide for the same. That the militia shall not be subject to martial law, 
except when in actual service, in time of war, invasion or rebellion • • • • 
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be subject to martial law, but would completely ignore the fate of 
state citizens conscripted directly into a national army. Rather, the 
conclusions seems inescapable that the Maryland and Virginia 
delegates believed that the militia clauses constituted the sole 
mechanism by which unwilling citizens could be brought under the 
jurisdiction of the federal military apparatus. 
4. Amendments on Term of Enlistment 
In addition to the amendment concerning military jurisdiction, 
the Maryland convention proposed several other limitations on the 
military power. Two of these amendments provided that soldiers 
could not be quartered in private houses and that no mutiny bill 
could continue in force longer than two years; a third stipulated 
that "no soldier be enlisted for a longer time than four years, except 
in time of war, and then only during the war."159 Amendments 
which were virtually identical to the latter provision were also 
introduced in North Carolina160 and Virginia.161 
According to the proponents of the Maryland amendments, the 
three limitations on the federal government were necessary because 
"[t]hese were the only checks that could be obtained against the 
unlimited power of raising and regulating standing armies, the 
natural enemies of freedom."162 But surely the amendment limiting 
terms of enlistment would be a failure in achieving this objective 
if the federal government had the power to conscript citizens for 
unlimited periods of time. Again, the conclusion seems inescapable 
that the delegates who proposed these limitations on the central 
government's military powers never imagined that the new Con-
stitution granted Congress the greater power of direct conscription. 
5. Proposals Concerning Conscientious Objectors 
Since many Pennsylvania citizens were Quakers who opposed 
military service in any form, that state's convention was forced to 
deal with the problem of conscientious objection. Thomas McKean 
discussed this problem; but, significantly, he referred to conscien-
tious objection only in the context of the federal government's 
control over the militia, and not in relation to Congress' power to 
raise and support armies.163 The minority report issued by the 
159. 2 DEBATES 552. 
160. 4 id. at 245. 
161. 3 id. at 660. 
162. 2 id. at 552. 
163. Id. at 537: "It is objected tbat tbe powers of Congress are too large, because 
'tbey have tbe power of calling for tbe militia on necessary occasions, and may call 
tbem from one end of tbe continent to tbe otber, and wantonly harass tbem; besides, 
tbey may coerce men to act in tbe militia whose consciences are against bearing 
arms in any case.' .. 
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Pennsylvania Antifederalists was also quite explicit in condemning 
the incursions on individual liberty that were possible under the 
militia clause: 
The absolute unqualified command that Congress have over 
the militia may be made instrumental to the destruction of all 
liberty .•.. 
First, the personal liberty of every man, probably from sixteen 
to sixty years of age, may be destroyed by the power Congress have 
in organizing and governing of the militia.164 
The Pennsylvania dissenters did not mention the threat to "the 
personal liberty of every man" in connection with the federal gov-
ernment's power to raise armies; in their view, apparently, the 
only compulsory military service contemplated by the Constitution 
was through the state militias. The minority delegates advanced 
another objection: 
Secondly, the rights of conscience may be violated, as there is no 
exemption of those persons who are conscientiously scrupulous of 
bearing arms. These compose a respectable proportion of the com-
munity in the state .... 
[During the Revolution] the framers of our State Constitution 
made the most express and decided declaration and stipulations in 
favor of the rights of conscience; but now, when no necessity exists, 
those dearest rights of men are left insecure.165 
The Pennsylvania dissenters' failure to relate the problem of con-
scientious objection to the provision for a standing army is easily 
explained by hypothesizing their belief that the regular army would 
be composed solely of volunteers who obviously would have no 
scruples about bearing arms. 
6. Financial Aspects of the Military Power 
The contemporary identification of "the power of the purse and 
the power of the sword" served to focus the attention of many state 
delegates upon the government's financial ability to support an 
army, and those who believed in the need for a strong system of 
national defense often asserted that Congress should be able to 
raise substantial sums of money quickly in the event of invasion or 
other emergency.166 As a corollary to this proposition, however, pro-
ponents of a strong central government believed that the Congress 
164. J. McMAsrER & F. STONE, supra note 135, at 480. 
165. Id. at 480-81. 
166. See, e.g., 2 DEBATES 66-67 (remarks of Christopher Gore of Boston): "Is 
America to wait until she is attacked, before she attempts a preparation at defense? 
This certainly would be unwise; it would be courting our enemies to make war upon 
us. The operations of war are sudden, and call for large sums of money." See also id. 
at 68, 189, 191. 
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would need financial power in order to buy an army through en-
listments. Thus, James Wilson of Pennsylvania asked rhetorically: 
Have not the freest of governments those powers [ of the sword and 
the purse]? And are they not in the fullest exercise of them? ..• 
Can we create a government without the power to act? How can it 
act without the assistance of men? And how are men to be pro-
cured without being paid for their services?167 
On the other hand, Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee opposed 
granting the national government unrestricted power to "engage 
officers and men for any number of years"; it was his fear that "[w]e 
shall have a large standing army as soon as the monies to support 
them can possibly be found."168 "An army is not a very agreeable 
place of employment," he added, "for the young gentlemen of many 
families"; 169 apparently he was concerned that those who would be 
attracted to a professional army would be insensitive to the values 
of liberty. 
Some delegates also were apprehensive about the impact that 
compulsory militia service would have upon the civilian economy. 
Since the vast majority of citizens were farmers by occupation, a call 
of the militia during the planting or harvesting season could cause 
great hardship. Thus, Edmund Randolph,170 Henry Lee,171 and 
Francis Corbin supported a professional army that would promote 
a more appropriate division of labor. Corbin argued to the Virginia 
convention: 
I£ some of the community are exclusively inured to its defence, and 
the rest attend to agriculture, the consequence will be, that the arts 
of war and defence, and of cultivating the soil, will be under-
stood .... If, on the contrary, our defence be solely intrusted to 
militia, ignorance of arms and negligence of farming will ensue .... 
If we are called in the time of sowing seed, or of harvest, the means 
of subsistence might be lost; and the loss of one year's crop might 
have been prevented by a trivial expense, if appropriated to the 
purpose of supporting a part of the community, exclusively occupied 
in the defence of the whole.172 
Thus in the eyes of Corbin, Lee, and Randolph, regular troops-
167. 2 id. at 522. • 
168. Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Letter No. III), in EssEN· 
TIAL WORKS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 282 (L. Kriegel ed. 1964). 
169. Id. at 282-83. 
170. 3 DEBATES 77: "The militia of our country will be wanted for agriculture 
•••• It must be neglected if those hands which ought to attend to it are occasionally 
called forth on military expeditions." 
171. See id. at 177. Henry "Light-Horse Harry" Lee should not be confused 
with his cousin Richard Henry Lee (see text accompanying note 168 supra). For 
biographies of the two men, see lI DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAl'HY 107, 117 (D. 
Malone ed. 1933). 
172. 3 DEBATES 112-13. 
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"a part of the community, exclusively occupied in the defense of the 
whole"-would take the military burden off the militia-the yeo-
men of the country who would devote themselves to agriculture and 
the mechanic arts. In their view, the farmers-the citizens at large 
-could not be forced into the regular army. In that case men 
would be called out at sowing time or at the harvest, which all three 
men saw as dangerous to agricultural industry. Wilson Nicholas 
discerned another economic reason for relying upon a professional 
volunteer army. Even if the militia were adequate for national de-
fense, he contended, reliance on state forces imposed an unequal 
burden upon the poor. "If war be supported by militia," he argued, 
"it is by personal service. The poor man does just as much as the 
rich. Is this just?" Moreover, the rich man could easily exempt him-
self by finding a substitute. But if the military duties were entrusted 
to a regular army, Nicholas said, the soldiers would be "paid by 
taxes raised from the people, according to their property; and then 
the rich man pays an adequate share."173 Thus, according to Nich-
olas, when regular troops were used to carry on a war, personal ser-
vice by the poor would not be required; professional soldiers would 
be used, paid for by taxes. This argument strikes an ironic note in 
light of current debates upon the desirability of a volunteer army;174 
but the clear import of the delegates' discussion of economic factors 
is that the regular army was viewed by all parties as a professional 
force procured by enlistments, not by forced service of the people. 
E. Early Congresses and the Military Power 
The actions of the first Congresses elected under the Constitution, 
which included many of the delegates to the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, support the view that conscription was not authorized by the 
Constitution. One of the most important items of business confront-
ing the first Congress was, of course, the promulgation of a Bill of 
Rights, and, in June of 1789, James Madison introduced a series of 
proposed amendments to the Constitution. One of these, which 
eventually became the second amendment, stated: 
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed; a well-armed and well-regulated militia being the best 
security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of 
bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in 
person.1711 
173. Id. at 389. 
174. See, e.g., G. REEDY, WHO WILL Do OUR FIGHTING FOR Us? 56 (1969): "When 
we say 'volunteer army' we are really saying an army composed of the poor and the 
black." 
175. I .ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 1st Cong., 434 (1834). 
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The fact that Madison sought to insert a conscientious-objector 
clause into the Constitution indicates the significance he ascribed 
to freedom of conscience; yet, his proposed objector clause dealt 
only with the militia power. It seems difficult to believe that he 
would seek to limit the militia's power to compel service in this 
manner and ignore a comparable power in the federal government, 
if there was any serious possibility that the federal government 
could conscript citizens. Like the other statesmen of the time, he 
apparently thought that compulsory military service could take 
place only in the militia, and that was the only area about which he 
concerned himself. 
Opponents of Madis~n's conscientious-objector clause argued 
that the problem was too difficult and uncertain to be dealt with by 
an inflexible constitutional provision,176 and the clause was finally 
eliminated in September 1789 by the Senate.177 However, the second 
amendment that was finally adopted emphasizes once again the 
sharp distinction that was made between the militia and the regular 
army at the time the Constitution was adopted. The amendment's 
assertions that the militia was "necessary to the security of a free 
state" and that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall 
not be infringed" can be traced to the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion. There, George Mason had argued that the federal government 
might "neglect" or "harass and abuse" the militia "in order to have 
the pretense of establishing a standing army."178 Patrick Henry had 
agreed; in his opinion, the "militia ... is our ultimate safety. We 
can have no security without it."179 Thus, the people organized in 
the state militias were regarded as a counterforce against the threat 
that the regular army could be used as an instrument of oppres-
176. See, e.g., id. at 751 (remarks of Representative Benson of New York): 
If this stands part of the Constitution, it will be a question before the Judiciary 
on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of this militia 
..•• It is extremely injudicious to intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals. 
I have no reason to believe but the Legislature will always possess humanity 
enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but 
they ought to be left to their discretion. 
177. See E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 46 n.9 
(1957). There was strong sentiment in the House for the provision. Elias Boudinot, 
once President of the Continental Congress and in 1789 a Representative from New 
Jersey, defended the conscientious-objector clause. "In forming a militia,'' he said "an 
effectual defence ought to be calculated, and no characters of this religious descrip-
tion ought to be compelled to take up arms." He added that "by striking out the 
clause, people may be led to believe that there is an intention in the General Govern• 
ment to compel all its citizens to bear arms." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 1st Cong., 767. Of 
course, since the clause in question related only to the militia, Boudinot's statements 
would make no sense if Congress had the power to conscript. For in that case the 
general government would be able "to compel all its citizens to bear arms," a power 
which Boudinot was denying. 
178. 3 DEBATES 379. 
179. Id. at 385. 
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sion,180 and service in the militia was a right of the citizen that 
could not be transgressed by the federal govemment.181 Clearly, this 
balance of power could be upset, and the citizen's right to bear arms 
in the militia undermined, if the federal government had the power 
to compel large numbers of citizens to serve in the regular army. 
Congress moved quickly to implement the military sections of 
the Constitution. At the instigation of Secretary of War Knox, a 
statute was passed in September of 1789 legalizing the existence of 
the 840-man army inherited from the Confederation;182 about six 
months later the authorized force was increased to over a thousand 
men.183 The statutes clearly dealt only with enlisted forces, but in 
spite of this fact, there was substantial opposition in Congress to the 
creation of a standing army.184 
The size of the regular army was increased twice more during 
the next two years,18° and in May of 1792 Congress passed a uni-
form militia law.186 The latter provision had developed from a plan 
proposed by Secretary of War Knox in 1790 which would have 
obliged every male citizen to enroll and train for specific periods in 
a federally organized militia system. A select part of the militia-
the "advanced corps" of younger men-would be extensively 
trained and ready for service on short notice. Congressional opposi-
tion to this proposal proved insurmountable,187 and, after two years 
180. Cf. R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 87 (1967): "It was pos-
sible to regard the state militias as a check against a federal standing army, since they 
had just accomplished a very similar purpose: they had given birth to the Continental 
Army to check the threat of military despotism from the British army.'' 
181. Thus, Antifederalist Elbridge Gerry had argued against the inclusion of 
Madison's conscientious-objector clause in the Bill of Rights on the ground that 
Congress could declare large numbers of citizens religiously scrupulous "and thus 
prevent them from bearing arms" in the militia. I ANNA.IS OF CONGRESS, 1st Cong., 
749-50 (1834). 
182. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95. 
183. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 10, I Stat. 119. 
184. On March 30, 1790, Senator William Maclay confided to his diary: 
This bill seems laying the foundation of a standing army. The justifiable reasons 
for using force seem to be the enforcing of law, quelling insurrections, and re-
pelling invasions. The Constitution directs all these to be done by militia. Should 
the United States, unfortunately, be involved in war, an army for the annoyance 
of our enemy in their own country, (as the most effective mode of keeping the 
calamity at a distance • • . ) will be necessary. 
THE JOURNAIS OF WILLIA.111 MACLAY 221 (E. Maclay ed. 1965). It is interesting to note 
that Maclay's conception of a foreign expeditionary force is an extension of Hamilton's 
idea that the regular a1my would serve only as a frontier garrison and as a holding 
force to permit time for mobilization of the militia in the event of invasion; see text 
accompanying notes 115-16 supra. 
185. Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 222; Act of March 5, 1792, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 
241. 
186. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271. 
187. Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania, a member of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, asked "whether it would be the most eligible mode to subject all the citizens 
••. to turn out as soldiers. A much smaller number would, in his opinion, an5'ver 
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of consideration, Congress passed a law which required enrollment 
but did not specify any particular duration or type of training for 
the militia; these matters were left entirely to the states. Perhaps 
the most significant aspect of the episode is the fact that Knox, the 
foremost advocate of a strong military system, sought to establish 
compulsory universal military training not under the Constitutional 
grant of power to raise and support armies, but under the militia 
clause. 
The early debates on the military also reflect a perception by 
many congressmen that their control over the militia was secon-
dary to the states' regulatory power. Thus, one representative as-
serted that "the States alone are to say of what description of persons 
the militia shall consist, and who shall be exempt from militia duty; 
Congress have only power to organize them, when thus desig-
nated."188 
Questions about the proper size and composition of the military 
establishment were before Congress frequently during the early 
years of the Republic, particularly with regard to the kind of force 
that should be used to fight the Indians. Those who advocated the 
use of regular troops emphasized the adverse impact on agriculture 
that would result from use of the militia,189 or the unreliability of 
poorly trained militiamen;190 others contended that the regular 
troops were "trash" who "enlist for three dollars a month; which, 
in a country like the United States, is a sufficient description of 
their bodies as well as their minds."191 When the Whiskey Re-
bellion erupted in 1794, it was the militia that was summoned to 
suppress it; Washington called out 12,000 militiamen from four 
states, and maintained a peacekeeping force of 2,500 in the area 
after order was restored.192 Early Congresses also depended heavily 
on militia groups entering the federal service of their own choice. 
These volunteer units had a long tradition dating from the colonial 
period; frequently they furnished their own arms and elaborate uni-
all the purposes of a militia." 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1805 (1790). Elias Boudinot 
agreed that there was "a manifest propriety in the measure." Id. In his diary, Maclay 
wrote: "General Knox offers a most exceptional bill for a general militia law which 
excites (as it is most probable he expected) a general opposition." THE JOURNALS 
OF WILLIAM MACLAY 235 (E. Maclay ed. 1965). 
188. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 2d Cong., 419 (1849) (remarks of Representative Sturges). 
Congressman Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire concurred. "It is a militia of the 
several States that Congress have power to organize, and provide a mode of discipline 
for. It is not a militia to be formed, or created-it already exists. He therefore 
thought it best to leave it to the respective States to make their own militia laws." Id. 
189. Id. at 775-76. 
190. Id. at 779. 
191. Id. at 796. 
192. Congress authorized these actions. Act of Nov. 29, 1794, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 403. 
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forms, and were composed of social elites.193 In 1794194 and 1798,195 
Congress authorized the President to accept volunteer militia units, 
but the statutes maintained a distinction between these groups and 
the troops obtained by regular enlistments. 
Thus, in the first ten years of the nation Congress evidenced its 
understanding of the military powers granted in the Constitution 
by: (1) debating a constitutional amendment on conscientious ob-
jection which focused on the militia as the only compulsory mili-
tary force; (2) passing the second amendment, which was totally 
incompatible with any notion of federal conscription; (3) grudg-
ingly increasing the size of its regular, enlisted army; (4) passing a 
tepid militia law because it did not wish to compel the citizens to 
train in the militia; and (5) distinguishing between the "trash" of 
the regular army and the industrious yeoman of the militia. At no 
time during this period-not even during the quasi-war with France 
in 1797-1800-was there the slightest hint that Congress might 
have the power to enforce direct conscription. 
F. The Relationship Between the Militia 
and the Regular Army 
In the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Supreme Court placed 
considerable reliance on the relationship between the militia and 
the regular forces. The Court opened this phase of its argument by 
citing the portion of article I, section 10 which prohibits the states 
from keeping "Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace" without 
the consent of Congress. This provision, together with the difficul-
ties experienced by the Continental Congress in trying to get the 
states to meet their troop quotas and the grant of power to raise 
armies, led the Court to infer that the framers had intended to vest 
all the military powers in Congress.196 Therefore, Chief Justice 
White concluded, "[t]here was left ... under the sway of the States 
undelegated the control of the militia to the extent that such 
control was not taken away by the exercise by Congress of its power 
to raise armies."197 
193. See, e.g., R. 'WEIGLEY, supra note 180, at 8. 
194. Act of May 9, 1794, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 367. 
195. Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 558. 
196. 245 U.S. at 382: 
The right on the one hand of Congress under the Confederation to call on the 
States for forces and the duty on the other of the States to furnish when called, 
embraced the complete power of government over the subject. 'When the two 
were combined and were delegated to Congress all governmental power on that 
subject was conferred, a result manifested not only by the grant made but by 
the limitation expressly put upon the States on the subject. The army sphere 
therefore embraces such complete authority. 
197. 245 U.S. at 383. 
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It is undoubtedly true that the military clauses of the Constitu-
tion were designed in part to remedy the central government's lack 
of power under the Articles of Confederation; Alexander Hamil-
ton's belief that a permanent military corps was needed to perform 
duties for which the militia was inappropriate198 and his argument 
that sole reliance on the states for national defense could lead to un-
equal burdens or disastrous rivalries199 clearly weighed heavily with 
those who assisted in drafting the Constitution. But these acknowl-
edged facts hardly support the conclusion that Congress' power to 
raise and support armies extended to all attributes of state militia 
power, including the authority to conscript. Rather, the available 
historical evidence indicates that the Supreme Court in Arver did 
not pursue the distinction ben\Teen the militia power and the army 
power far enough, and that the framers did not view the state militias 
and the federal army as simply complementary manifestations of the 
same power. 
It is clear that the framers imposed no specific limitations on 
how the federal government could use its regular forces; in the 
opinion of some early statesmen, they could even be sent abroad to 
fight in foreign wars.200 At the same time, the militia could be used 
only for the limited purposes enumerated in the Constitution, and 
the states could not maintain regular forces on duty. This differen-
tial treatment of the uses to which the army and the militia could 
be put provides a marked contrast to the prevailing understanding 
of how the manpower could be raised for each force. The fact that 
the states could compel militia service did not mean that Congress 
would have equivalent power with respect to the army. As the pre-
ceding discussion of the Philadelphia Convention, The Federalist 
Papers, and the state ratifying conventions indicates, the contempo-
rary understanding was that the regular army would be composed 
of volunteers who could not legitimately object if they were ex-
posed to the dangers of questionable domestic conflicts or foreign 
entanglements. Indeed, the fact that various restrictions were im-
posed upon the use of the militia reflects the framers' belief that 
the citizens should not be taken into the army against their wills 
and employed in any military venture that the federal government 
might undertake. Thus, if the Court in the Selective Draft Law 
Cases had been more sensitive to the historical context in drawing 
inferences from the constitutional distinction between the militia 
and the regular army, it would not have concluded that every 
198. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 156-57 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
199. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 158-59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
200. See note 184 supra. 
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attribute of one force necessarily attached to the other. Instead, 
history points to the conclusion that the framers gave the federal 
government wide powers to use its army but not to gather it, while 
the militia's functions were specified but its manpower source was 
unlimited. 
IV. THE NATION'S MILITARY HISTORY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
A. The War of 1812 
A major portion of the Court's opinion in the Selective Draft 
Law Cases dealt with the federal government's attempts to imple-
ment universal conscription after the adoption of the Constitution. 
The first significant attempt to enact a draft law occurred during 
the War of 1812, according to the Court, "[e]ither because [the 
existing regular army and militia force] proved to be weak in num-
bers or because of insubordination developed among the forces 
called and manifested by their refusal to cross the border."201 In 
response to these pressures, Secretary of War Monroe introduced a 
plan to "call a designated number out of the population between 
the ages of 18 and 45 for service in the army."202 The Court con-
ceded that congressional opposition against the bill developed, but 
states that "we need not stop to consider it because it substantialiy 
rested upon the incompatibility of compulsory military service with 
free government, a subject which from what we have said has been 
disposed of. "203 
In this manner, the Court blithely dismissed the most significant 
aspect of the Monroe Plan: .not the fact that it was introduced, but 
the fact that Congress never passed the proposal because a substan-
tial number of congressmen did not believe that the federal 
government had power to conscript. Senator Christopher Gore's 
assertion that the plan "never will and never ought to be submitted 
to by this country, while it retains one idea of civil freedom"204 was 
representative of the tenor of remarks made by those who opposed 
conscription,205 and came with particular force from a man who had 
been a strong proponent of the Constitution in the Massachusetts 
201. 245 U.S. at 384. 
202. 245 U.S. at 385. 
203. 245 U.S. at 385. 
204. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 13th Cong., 3d Sess., 100 (1854). 
205. Senator David Daggett of Connecticut opposed the bill because "it is utterly 
inconsistent with principles (of civil liberty] to compel any man to become a soldier 
for life, during a war, or for any fixed time. In Great Britain, a war-like nation .•• 
no such practice is, or can be, resorted to; the people would revolt at it • . . • It is 
alike odious here, and I hope it will remain so." Id. at 72. Similarly, Robert Golds-
borough of Maryland challenged his fellow senators, saying "you dare not •.. attempt 
a conscription to fill the ranks of your regular army." Id. at 107. 
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ratifying convention. Several congressmen made more detailed at-
tacks upon the proposal. Senator Jeremiah Mason of New Hamp-
shire addressed himself to the specific problem of "whether the 
Constitution gives to this Government the power contended for," 
and found several grounds for concluding that it did not. In the 
first place, he observed, nothing in the Constitution imposed limits 
upon the sweeping power that the Government sought: 
The power claimed is, doubtless, vastly greater and more dangerous 
than any other possessed by the Government. It subjects the per-
sonal freedom of every citizen, in comparison with which the rights 
of property are insignificant, to arbitrary discretion. Had there been 
the intention of granting such power, would there not have been 
some attempt to guard against the unjust and oppressive exercise 
of it, as was done in the granting of power of less importance?206 
Furthermore, Mason argued, the constitutional grant of power "to 
provide and maintain a navy" could equally support the implica-
tion of a power to conscript, and the manpower need was, if any-
thing, greater in the naval service; yet the government was not seek-
ing the power to conscript for the navy. Indeed, Mason pointed out: 
The British Government, before the Revolution did attempt to 
exercise in this country the supposed right of impressment for the 
Navy, which it never did for the Army .... Yet the Government, in 
their instructions to our Envoys for treating of peace with Great 
Britain, say "impressment is not an American practice but it is 
utterly repugnant to our Constitution and laws." The honorable 
Secretary [Monroe] when he drafted those instructions, knew not 
how soon he should be directed to contend for the contrary doc-
trine.201 
The most eloquent attack on the Monroe Plan was made by 
Daniel Webster, who addressed the House of Representatives on 
December 9, 1814. First, he noted, the proposal went beyond the 
acknowledged power to call out the militia according to its existing 
organization; it was, in effect, a plan to raise "a standing army out 
of the militia by draft."208 Therefore, Webster stated, "The ques-
tion is nothing less than whether the most essential rights of per-
sonal liberty shall be surrendered, and despotism embraced in its 
worst form."209 He then proceeded to ask: 
41> Is this, sir, consistent with the character of a free government? Is 
this civil liberty? Is this the real character of our Constitution? No, 
sir, indeed it is not. The Constitution is libelled, foully libelled. 
206. Id. at 80. 
207. Id. at 81. 
208. 14 THE WRlTINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 57 (1903). 
209. Id. 
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The people of this country have not established for themselves such 
a fabric of despotism. They have not purchased at a vast expense of 
their own treasure and their own blood a Magna Charta to be 
slaves. ·wnere is it ·written in the Constitution . . . that you may 
take children from their parents, and parents from their children, 
and compel them to fight the battles of any war in which the folly 
or the wickedness of government may engage it?210 
Webster then turned his attention to the source of the power to 
conscript "which now for the first time comes forth ... to trample 
down and destroy the dearest rights of personal liberty .... "211 The 
Government's claim of constitutional power was summarily dis-
missed: "I almost disdain to go to quotations and references to 
prove that such an abominable doctrine has no foundation in the 
Constitution of the country. It is enough to know that the instru-
ment was intended as the basis of a free government, and that the 
power contended for is incompatible with any notion of personal 
liberty."212 Nor, argued Webster, could the Secretary of War justify 
his plan by saying that Congress could raise armies by any means 
not prohibited by the Constitution, and that "the power to raise 
would be granted in vain" if there were insufficient enlistments. "If 
this reasoning could prove anything," Webster retorted, "it would 
equally show, that whenever the legitimate power of the Constitu-
tion should be so badly administered as to cease to answer the great 
ends intended by them, such new powers may be assumed or 
usurped, as any existing administration may deem expedient."213 
This strong opposition made passage of the Monroe Plan a prac-
tical impossibility. John C. Calhoun, then a young representative 
from South Carolina, summarized the alternatives that were avail-
able to the federal government: "[T]he military force by which we 
can operate consists of . . . the regular force, whose general charac-
ter is mercenary, the soldiers enlisting for the sake of bounty and 
subsistence; draughted militia called into the field by patriotic mo-
tives only.''214 Congress eventually settled upon a plan under which 
volunteer militia units could enlist for specific short periods; if 
they engaged to serve for more than nine months, the volunteers 
could receive acreage from the public lands instead of monthly 
pay.215 The threat of a system of federal conscription, however, had 
repercussions even outside the Congress. In January of 1815, rep-
210. Id. at 61. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 62. 
213. Id. at 63-64. 
214. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 13th Cong., 3d Sess., 531 (1854). 
215. See SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, 3 THE SEI.ECTlVE SERVICE Ac:r 155 (Special 
Monograph No. 2, 1954). 
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resentatives of various New England states that were opposed to the 
war met at the Hartford Convention. One of the resolutions which 
they passed recommended that the states "adopt all such measures 
as may be necessary effectually to protect the citizens of said states" 
against acts of Congress "which shall contain provision, subjecting 
the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or im-
pressments, not authorized by the 'constitution of the United 
States,' "216 Thus, a substantial group of influential political leaders, 
within three decades after the Constitution was ratified, vigorously 
asserted that the federal government did not have the power of 
direct conscription; yet the Aroer Court, in a single sentence, dis-
missed their arguments as irrelevant. 
B. The Civil War 
A final major point relied upon by the Supreme Court in the 
Selective Draft Law Cases was the use of direct conscription during 
the Civil War. Chief Justice White noted that early in the war the 
Union government relied upon militia and volunteers; when more 
men were required, however, a draft law was proposed and 
passed.217 There is some doubt as to whether the true purpose of the 
Civil War Enrollment Act was to procure men through conscrip-
tion; it seems equally possible that, as one historian has asserted, the 
measure was designed merely to stimulate enlistments in the regular 
army.218 In any event, it is clear that even during the exigencies of 
the Civil War, a large segment of the populace actively opposed the 
draft. 
The act was quite lenient by today's standards; for example, a 
drafted man could hire a substitute to perform his service for him, 
216. A. FRIED, THE JEFFERSONIAN AND HAMILTONIAN TRADITION IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 93 (1968). 
217. 245 U.S. at 386: 
By [the Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731.J, which was clearly intended 
to directly exert upon all the citizens of the United States the national power 
which it had been proposed to exert in 1814 •.• every male citizen of the 
United States between the ages of twenty and forty-five was made subject by 
the direct action of Congress to be called by compulsory draft to service in a 
national army at such time and in such numbers as the President in his discre-
tion might find necessary. 
218. 1 F. SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION AlllllY, 
1861-1865, at 308 (1928): 
Very clearly the law was never intended as a direct procurer of men but merely 
as a whip in the hands of the federal government to stimulate state activities. 
Even the name of conscription was avoided by its friends who always spoke of 
it as the "enrollment bill." Only its enemies called it a "conscription bill," which 
term was considered by the administration men as an unfair epithet. But they 
knew whereof they spoke for, as they shaped it, the bill was not a conscription 
bill in any general sense; it was merely a piece of class legislation designed • • • 
merely to stimulate mercenary establishments and to match the rich man's dol-
lars with the poor man's life. None would have been more horrified than Henry 
Wilson [the act's author] at the suggestion that every able-bodied man drafted 
should be compelled to serve .••• 
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or could purchase outright commutation from the draft.219 Never-
theless, popular sentiment against conscription was so strong that 
protest riots occurred in many cities throughout the country. The 
largest disturbance, which took place in New York City, resulted in 
an estimated 1,200 deaths and millions of dollars in property dam-
age. Fifteen regiments of regular troops were eventually required 
before the pillaging mobs could be subdued. A recent commentator 
has suggested several reasons for this violent reaction to the draft: 
There was something deeply disturbing about a national military 
draft at best. It was not unheard of for states to raise their army 
quotas by various forms of compulsion, true. But a state govern-
ment in the 1860's exerted a neighborly, close-to-home sort of 
authority. Or at least it seemed so to most people. Washington was 
different-distant and unfeeling, somehow alien. And for the aver-
age citizen, this new Act was the first effort the Federal government 
had ever made to reach out its long arm and lay its heavy hand 
directly on his-hisl-shoulder.220 
Some state and local governments joined the popular opposition 
to conscription. The state of Delaware and the city of Troy, New 
York, for example, passed laws authorizing the local government to 
pay the commutation fee for residents, and the Governor of Massa-
chusetts asked the Secretary of War to suspend operation of the 
draft in that state for six or seven weeks because a sufficient number 
of substitutes could not be found. The people were also astute to 
find means of circumventing the draft law. Enrolling officers, who 
were required to canvass neighborhoods in order to find eligible 
males, were frequently lied to, avoided, and even physically at-
tacked. Outright evasion was so widespread that a new word-
"skedaddling"-was coined to describe it; new to'wns sprang up 
just across the northern borders in Canada, and many men took 
refuge in California or the mining towns of the western territories. 
In many parts of New England, so many farm laborers had deserted 
their employers and fled from the draft that crops were harvested 
only with great difficulty. The total number of "skedaddlers" may 
have been as high as 200,000.221 
Fraudulent exemptions were another popular means of evc1,sion, 
and approximately 316,000 exemptions were made under the con-
scription law. When firemen became exempt, some towns enrolled 
219. Civil War Enrollment Act, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 733 (1863). Subsequently the 
commutation fee was eliminated except for conscientious objectors (Act of July 4, 1864, 
ch. 237, §§ 2, 10, 13 Stat. 379-80), but enrollees were still permitted to furnish substi-
tutes (Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 237, § 11, 13 Stat. 380). 
220. J. l\IcCAGUE, THE SECOND REBELLION 17 (1968). 
221. 2 F. SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND AD~UNISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY, 
1861-1865, at 184-85 (1928). 
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all of their able-bodied men into the fire brigade; in 1864 Congress 
had to pass special legislation to meet such wholesale attempts to 
avoid service.222 Malingering of practically every variety occurred, 
even to the point that some men maimed themselves in order to fail 
the physical requirements for the army. The combination of eva-
sion, exemptions, commutations, and armed resistance showed that 
a substantial portion of the nation was not prepared to accept con-
scription as a part of the citizen's obligation to the state. As the end 
of the war approached, Congress began to respond to this general 
opposition; in March of 1865, a law providing for more liberal sub-
stitution was passed,223 and the following month the draft law was 
allowed to expire. 
This history of inefficiency and evasion seems to cast doubt on 
the Aroer Court's assertion that "[i]t would be childish to deny the 
value of the added strength which was ... afforded"224 by the Civil 
War draft. The Court based this conclusion on "the official report 
of the Provost Marshall General," which claimed that "it was the 
efficient aid resulting from the forces created by the draft ... which 
obviated a disaster ... and carried that struggle to a complete and 
successful conclusion."225 The available statistics, however, cast con-
siderable doubt on this assertion: 
Altogether, only six per cent of the 2,666,999 men who served in the 
Union Army during the Civil ·war were secured directly through 
conscription. Of 249,259 persons "held to service" under the Enroll-
ment Act of 1863, 86,724 escaped by payment of commutation, 
leaving 168,649 "men raised." But of the latter, 116,188 were sub-
stitutes, and only 46,347 were "held to personal service."226 
No case questioning the Civil War draft was heard by the Su-
preme Court, but it is known that Chief Justice Roger Taney 
prepared a rough outline of an opinion declaring the act unconsti-
tutional. Taney's draft opinion began by noting that congressional 
power to call out the militia for specified purposes, and asking 
"what description of persons composes the militia who ... may be 
called to aid the general government in the emergencies . . . men-
tioned?"227 The answer, he said, could be found in the second 
amendment's declaration that "a well regulated Militia; being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed": 
222. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, 13 Stat. 6. 
223. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, 13 Stat. 487. 
224. 245 U.S. at 387. 
225. Id. 
226. R. WEIGLEY, HISIORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 210 (1967). 
227. 18 TYLER'S QUARTERLY HISTORICAL AND GENEALOGICAL MAGAZINE 79 (1939). 
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The militia is therefore to be composed of Citizens of the States, 
who retain all their rights and privileges as citizens, who when 
called into service by the United States are not to be "fused into one 
body"-nor confounded with the Army of the United States, but 
are to be called out as the militia of the several states . . . and 
consequently commanded by the officers appointed by the State. It 
is only in that form or organization that they are recognized in the 
Constitution as a military force.22s 
Given this clear distinction between the army and the militia, 
Taney continued, the limitations on the President's power to con-
trol the militia are equally clear: "He has no power over the Militia 
unless [they are] called into the actual service of the United States. 
They are then called out in the language of the Constitution, as 
the militia of the several States."229 This constitutional plan would 
be thwarted, Taney believed, if the government exercised the power 
of direct conscription: 
There is no longer any militia-it is absorbed in the Army. Every 
able bodied Citizen ... belongs to the national forces-that is to 
the Army of the United States .... 
The Generals, Colonels and other Officers appointed by the 
State according to the provisions of the Constitution are reduced to 
the ranks, and compelled to march as private soldiers ... and they 
and every other able bodied citizen except those whom it has been 
the pleasure of Congress to exempt, are compelled against their will 
to subject themselves to military law ... and to be treated as de-
serters if they refuse to surrender their civil rights.230 
Thus, said Taney, implying the power of direct conscription would 
create an inconsistency among the military clauses of the constitu-
tion; the power of direct conscription into the federal army and the 
militia provisions would be "repugnant to each other" because "if 
the conscription law be authorized by the Constitution, then all of 
the clauses so elaborately prepared in relation to the militia . . . 
are of no practical value and may be set aside and annulled when-
ever Congress may deem it expedient."231 Nor could this difficulty 
be overcome, Taney asserted, by claiming that no restrictions had 
been placed on the power to raise armies. "No just rule of construc-
tion," he wrote, "can give any weight to inferences drawn from gen-
eral words, when these inferences are opposed to special and express 
provisions [governing the militia], in the same instrument.''232 
Chief Justice Taney also relied upon history to support his con-
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 80. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 81. 
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struction of the military clauses. "During the period when the 
United States were English Colonies," he observed, "the Army of 
England-the standing army-was always raised by voluntary en-
listments-and the right to coerce all the able bodied subjects of 
the Crown into the ranks of the Army ... was not claimed or ex-
ercised by the English government."233 Against this historical back-
ground, Taney concluded, the words granting Congress the power 
to raise armies "necessarily implied that they were to be raised in 
the usual manner." Indeed, he added, "the general government 
has always heretofore so understood [the words] and has uniformly 
... recruited the ranks of its 'land forces' by volunteer enlistments 
for a specific period."234 
Chief Justice Taney never had the opportunity to perfect or 
deliver his opinion because the Government never brought a draft 
case to the Supreme Court. However, the constitutionality of the 
Civil War draft was questioned in the courts of Pennsylvania and 
ultimately was upheld in Kneedler v. Lane.235 The Kneedler case, 
upon which the Arver Court relied,236 was decided under rather 
unusual circumstances. It arose when three young men sued the 
local enrolling board to enjoin the board members from enforcing 
the law; the United States did not defend these actions, and on 
November 9, 1863, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced in 
a three-to-nvo decision that the law was unconstitutional. 
The first opinion for the majority was written by Chief Justice 
Walter Lowrie. He found that the Constitution recognized two dis-
tinct kinds of land forces, the militia and the army. The militia 
could be drawn into federal service only in the manner provided by 
the Constitution; if these forces were subject to paramount federal 
call, they could be effectively wiped out. Moreover, Lowrie said, 
the Constitution provides that taxes and duties must be raised ac-
cording to a rule of "uniformity, equality, or proportion," but no 
such requirement is imposed by the army clause. If the army "may 
be recruited by force," he asserted, "we find no regulation or lim-
itation of the exercise of the power, so as to prevent it from being 
arbitrary and partial, and hence we infer that such a mode of raising 
armies was not thought of, and was not granted." Lowrie dwelt at 
length on the dangers of implying such a broad power: 
I£ Congress may institute the plan now under consideration, as 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. 45 Pa. 238 (1863). 
236. 245 U.S. at 388. 
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a necessary and proper mode of exercising its power "to raise and 
support armies," then it seems to me to follow with more force 
that it may take a similar mode in the exercise of other powers, 
and may compel people to lend it their money; take their houses 
for offices and courts; . . . their mechanics and workshops for the 
different branches of business that are needed for army supplies; 
their physicians, ministers, and women for army surgeons, chaplains, 
nurses, and cooks ..•. I am quite unable now to suppose that so 
great a power could have been intended to be granted, and yet to 
be left so loosely guarded.231 
Judge George W. Woodward issued a concurring opinion which 
· relied heavily on the English experience. The framers, he said, had 
borrowed freely from the English system, and were familiar with 
the struggles which had prevented universal conscription in Great 
Britain. The framers intended, he argued, to create "a more free 
constitution than that of Great Britain-taking that as a model in 
some things-but enlarging the basis of popular rights in all re-
spects that would be consistent with order and stability." Thus 
Woodward concluded that "[a]ssuredly the framers of our constitu-
tion did not intend to subject the people of the states to a system 
of conscription which was applied in the mother country only to 
paupers and vagabonds."238 Judge James Thompson's concurrence 
also emphasized that the customary mode of raising armies in En-
gland had been voluntary enlistments. He then pointed out that at 
the time the Constitution was ratified a substantial segment of pub-
lic opinion opposed any form of standing army; "but what would 
have been thought," Thompson asked, "if it had been discovered or 
avowed that in its creation [the federal army] might be directly and 
openly destructive of the individual liberties of those who were to 
compose it, and that it might be extended to embrace all the able-
bodied citizens in the statesl"239 
The injunctions prayed for were issued on November 9, 1863. 
However, Chief Justice Lowrie's term expired on December 12, 
and he was replaced by Daniel Agnew, who was known to favor the 
draft. The Government then moved to vacate the injunctions. On 
January 16, 1864, the court vacated the initial orders over a bitter 
237. 45 Pa. at 248. 
238. 45 Pa. at 254-55. 
239. 45 Pa. at 267. The two judges who voted in favor of the act on first hearing 
were William Strong and John M. Read. Strong relied primarily upon the lack of 
constitutional restrictions on the power to raise armies, and upon the drafts imposed 
by the states during the Revolutionary War. Read depended upon the obligation 
of every member of society to defend the state; he cited the Knox plan of 1790, 
Monroe's 1814 draft proposal, and the English laws providing for a levy on idle and 
disorderly persons to show prior recognitions of the power. 
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dissent by Judge Woodward, who had just been elevated to the 
position of Chief Justice. The Government, he pointed out, had 
failed to appear in the first hearing even though every opportunity 
had been given them to present their views; nor had they made 
any effort to seek reargument while Chief Justice Lowrie was still 
on the bench. Moreover, he said, the decision granting the injunc-
tion was a final judgment which could have been appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court; in any event, the dissenting judges 
should have been bound by the initial decision since no new facts 
had been presented.240 On this divisive note, the Government ob-
tained a victory in the first case to pass upon the constitutionality 
of conscription; but the narrow margin of this victory is empha-
sized by the fact that three of the six Pennsylvania judges who con-
sidered the matter held that Congress lacked the power to enforce 
direct conscription. 
C. World War I and After 
After the expiration of the Civil War draft, the Government did 
not attempt to use conscription again until the outbreak of World 
War I. On April 5, 1917-the day before Congress declared war on 
Germany-the Wilson administration introduced its Army Bill, 
which provided for compulsory military service. Opposition arose 
immediately, with Speaker of the House Champ Clark insisting on 
a volunteer system. "I protest with all my heart and mind and soul," 
he proclaimed, "against having the slur of being a conscript placed 
upon the men of Missouri. In the estimation of Missourians there 
is precious little difference between a conscript and a convict."241 
The Senate opposition was led by Robert M. LaFollette. "[The] 
power once granted," he said, "will attach to the office [ of the Presi-
dent], and will be exercised so long as the Nation shall last, by every 
successive incumbent, no matter how ambitious or bloody-minded 
he may be."242 Nevertheless, on May 18, 1917, the Selective Service 
Act was passed by large majorities in both Houses. June 5, 1917, 
was set as registration day, and most Americans responded to the 
call. 
The hysteria of World War I created what was probably the 
most serious erosion of political and civil liberty in our history. 
Zechariah Chafee, in his famed analysis of Free Speech in the 
United States, recounts numerous instances of official disregard for 
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first amendment rights.243 Under the Espionage Act,244 any state-
ment which tended to obstruct the draft became criminal,245 and 
the courts enforced this provision vigorously. J. P. Doe, son of the 
great Chief Justice of New Hampshire, was convicted for writing a 
chain letter arguing that Germany had not broken its promise to 
the United States on submarine warfare. The producer of a film 
entitled "The Spirit of '76," which contained footage on Patrick 
Henry's speech, the Declaration of Independence, and scenes of 
British outrages committed during the Revolution, was also found 
guilty under the Espionage Act, since Britain was then our ally. 
Abraham Sugarman, Minnesota state secretary of the Socialist Party, 
told an open meeting: "This is supposed to be a free country. Like 
Hell it is." He then stated that the Selective Draft Act was unconsti-
tutional and that no one had to obey it. He, too, was convicted, and 
a federal judge sentenced him to three years at Leavenworth.246 
Ministers who preached that it was against Christian principles to 
fight were prosecuted, as were vigorous political opponents of con-
gressmen who had voted for conscription.247 Twenty-seven farmers 
from South Dakota claimed that their county's draft quota was too 
high and argued against the war generally; they received one-year 
sentences. Socialists, I.W.W. members, and labor leaders opposed 
to the war were systematically rounded up, tried in the most per-
functory manner before judges who openly called them traitors, 
and given maximum sentences. Newspapers and magazines that edi-
torialized against the war were denied mailing privileges; insuffi-
ciently patriotic teachers were removed from their posts.248 
In this atmosphere the Supreme Court's decision in the Selective 
Draft Law Cases was almost inevitable. Suggestions by critics of the 
war that the draft was unconstitutional had led to indictments 
under the Espionage Act, and the overwhelming sentiment in the 
country was in favor of maximum mobilization to fight the hated 
Germans. The briefs in the A rver case never even touched on the 
early history of the military clauses; instead, they focused primarily 
on the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of involuntary servi-
tude. It is most unfortunate that such an important question was 
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resolved in such an unsatisfactory decision; yet, despite its manifest 
deficiencies and questionable arguments, the Arver opinion has sur-
vived unchallenged as part of our constitutional doctrine. 
One reason for the survival of the Selective Draft Law Cases may 
be in the fact that conscription is a relatively rare phenomenon in 
this country. From 1789 until 1940-the first 151 years of the na-
tion's history-draft laws were in force for a total of only four years, 
once during the Civil War and once during World War I. Pro-
posals for compulsory military service were firmly rejected by Con-
gress in the 1920's and 1930's.249 Finally, when the German army 
overran France in 1940, Congress again assented to a conscription 
program-the first peacetime draft in our history--over vociferous 
opposition in both houses.250 This was the last time that any sub-
stantial political opinion opposed conscription until January 1969, 
when nine senators introduced a bill to return to a volunteer sys-
tem251 and President Nixon recommended abolition of the draft.202 
Perhaps the growing public opposition to the most unpopular war 
in the nation's history will persuade Congress to revert to the kind 
of military establishment contemplated by the Constitution, or pro-
vide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to give the military 
clauses of the Constitution the full and impartial judicial considera-
tion that they demand but have never received. 
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